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Start from the premise that the object of positive legal analysis is to 
resolve doctrine into matters of fact. That object certainly explains the 
common ground between such diverse intellectual enterprises as the 
economic analysis of law (including its iterations in behavioral decision 
theory1 and “neuroeconomics”2) and so called “critical theory” (from its 
various perspectives3). Each assumes that there is some fact qua empirical 
 * Rita Anne Rollins Professor of Law, The College of William & Mary School of Law. I am 
indebted to Richard McAdams, Richard Hynes, Michael Stein, James Dwyer, David Frisch, and 
Cynthia Ward for their comments on prior drafts of this Essay. Brian C. Hayes, J.D., 2005, The 
College of William & Mary School of Law, provided invaluable research assistance. Deficiencies of 
the finished project are the responsibility of the author alone. 
 1. See GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR (1976); CASS R. 
SUNSTEIN, BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS (2000). 
 2. See Morris B. Hoffman, The Neuroeconomic Path of the Law, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS 
ROYAL SOC’Y LONDON B 1667 (2004), available at http://www.pubs.royalsoc.ac.uk. 
 3. These include critical race theory, critical legal studies, and feminist legal thought. See 
RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION (2001); 
CATHERINE MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987); ROBERTO M. UNGER, THE CRITICAL 
LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT (1986). See generally Gary Minda, The Jurisprudential Movements of the 
1980s, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 599 (1989) (discussing and comparing law and economics, critical legal 
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fact that explains why the Law looks the way the Law looks.4 That fact 
may be efficiency,5 or it may be bigotry6 or some basic biological 
imperative that defies normative classification.7 Once “discovered,” the 
fundamental facts too may lend themselves to construction: One person’s 
efficiency is the other’s hegemony; what is racism or sexism from one 
perspective is respect for the individual from the next. Debate is not so 
much resolved as moved from the level of theory to fact to, perhaps 
ultimately, invective. But the object of “legal” analysis remains the same: 
to reveal the facts upon which the analysis is founded. We trust the 
ostensible objectivity of facts, and even the subjectivity of objectivity we 
assert as a discernible fact.8 
This Essay is a further and inevitable variation on that theme. I pursue 
here what might be termed “doctrinal jurisprudence”: Study of the way 
facts (including rules) become legal doctrine,9 specifically here how 
studies, and feminist legal thought). 
 4. I capitalize “Law” throughout to indicate the institution and use the initial lower case “l” to 
indicate a particular legal norm and thereby reduce the risk of confusing the two. 
 5. Among the fundamental assumptions of law and economics are that people make rational 
decisions designed to maximize self-interest; that common law is best understood as a system for 
maximizing efficiency; and that free markets produce the most efficient use of resources. RICHARD A. 
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW §§ 1–2 (5th ed. 1998). For the argument that the normative 
argument has offered, and continues to offer, more than the positive perspective, see Ian Ayres, 
Valuing Modern Contract Scholarship, 112 YALE L.J. 881 (2003). And for the argument that neither 
positive nor normative economic analysis of contract law has proved worthwhile, see Eric A. Posner, 
Economic Analysis of Contract Law After Three Decades: Success or Failure?, 112 YALE L.J. 829 
(2003) [hereinafter Posner, Success or Failure]. 
 6. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 62 (3d ed. 1992) (questioning 
whether black Americans have a permanent subordinate status and must accept that as fact); 
MACKINNON, supra note 3, at 4 (inequality and exploitation define male-female interaction); Joseph 
William Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE. L.J. 1, 6 (1984) 
(legal reasoning is inherently indeterminate, and law is not neutral). 
 7. See, e.g., E. Donald Elliot, The Tragi-Comedy of the Commons: Evolutionary Biology, 
Economics and Environmental Law, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 17 (2001) (explaining environmental law as 
an “adaptive response by a parasite to facilitate the survival of future generations by preserving” its 
host (emphasis removed)); Bailey Kuklin, Evolution, Politics, and Law, 38 VAL. U. L. REV. 1129 
(2004) (evolutionary biology can be used to derive normative principles of ethics); Richard A. Posner, 
Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551, 1561 (1998) 
(evolutionary biology can explain concepts, such as fairness, that would otherwise be irrational). 
 8. See infra note 134. 
 9. Joseph Raz captures well the dynamic that determines a rule’s elaboration into doctrine: 
A convention of reference sometimes exists which allows one to refer to a statute, or to the 
original judicial decision, when citing a legal rule, even though they are no more than the 
starting-point in the development of the rule, which is in a very real sense the product of the 
activities of several bodies over a period of time. 
 These complications mean, of course, that the rule as it is now may include aspects which 
cannot be attributed to its original creator. They are part of the rule because they are 
attributable to the author of a later intervention. 
JOSEPH RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 213, 229 (1994). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss2/2
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idiosyncratic perceptions concerning “justice” facts support the 
development of contract agreement doctrine.  
Analysis in terms of doctrine is heuristic in nature. That is, doctrine 
translates a bundle of data; we explain data (when, for example, a promise 
is enforceable) by reference to doctrine (when, say, there is “agreement”). 
But like all heuristics, doctrine is both under- and over-inclusive.10 
Doctrine does not formulate enough cases (and so we may adjust the 
doctrine or create a new exceptional category, like promissory estoppel11), 
or it formulates and determines the result in too many cases (in which 
event we refine the doctrine or create exceptions to its operation, like 
impossibility or frustration12). It is doctrine we encounter, normally as the 
elaboration of rules or a law, when we try to make sense of Law or an area 
of Law such as contract.  
This Essay investigates the relationship between the way we encounter 
data (including laws, and specifically a contract law) and what we may 
conclude about the Law, as doctrine, that emerges from that encounter. 
The study is limited to the contract law not because there is necessarily 
anything unique about contract so far as our encounter with law as data is 
concerned,13 but because the subject is fundamental and generally 
accessible. Further, in the formulation of contract doctrine you can see 
quite starkly the operation of forces generally at work in the Law. There is 
 10. So too, rules. See Frederick Schauer, Positivism as Pariah, in THE AUTONOMY OF LAW 31 
(Robert P. George ed., 1996) (“There are many bad laws. And there are many good laws that 
occasionally produce bad results as a consequence of the under- and over-inclusiveness of general 
rules.”). 
 11. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981). 
 12. Impossibility, or impracticability, discharges a party’s duty under a contract when: (1) the 
“party’s performance is made impracticable”; (2) “without his fault”; (3) “by the occurrence of an 
event the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract was made.” Id. 
§ 261. Frustration addresses the situation in which a party claims that some circumstance has so 
destroyed the value to him of the other party’s performance as to frustrate his own purpose in making 
the contract. Id. § 265. 
 13. But see Hoffman, supra note 2, at 1671, suggesting that there is something biologically 
unique about contract: 
It appears that humans, and indeed all intensely social animals, have a predisposition to 
follow three central behavioural rules: (i) promises to reciprocate must be kept (contract); (ii) 
reciprocal exchanges must be relatively equal (tort and criminal); and (iii) serious violations 
of the first two principles must be punished (enforcement). These three rules form the nucleus 
of a kind of neo-natural law that I suspect is part of our inherited natures, and therefore is 
both universal and relatively invariant. 
Id. (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). It might be more accurate to say that this Essay’s focus on 
contract is not meant to suggest that the observations offered here would not resonate as well in other 
areas of the Law. In fact, if Hoffman is right, because there is something fundamental about contract, 
the argument of this Essay may find traction beyond the contract law, as do contract concepts 
generally. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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also something else about contract doctrine that reveals a good deal about 
our encounter with Law: At several crucial junctures, contract expressly 
invokes conceptions of morality in the form of references to “justice” and 
“fairness” in order to resolve recurring sources of controversy. So an 
appreciation of our encounter with contract doctrine may intimate as well 
something about the Law-morality dynamic that underlies so much of the 
Law, or at least so much of the way we talk about Law.  
Though the scope of the Essay may seem broad, the goal is really quite 
modest: to discover a means to describe a structure to depict human 
agents’ encounter with justice-based contract doctrine. The goal is not to 
describe the constituents or determinants of justice in this or any context—
this is not an exercise in consequentialist or deontological theory. There 
may be nothing more fundamental to contract than the constituents of 
agreement, and justice is, as this Essay demonstrates, frequently the 
measure of contract liability. Agreement is the product of a “justice” 
calculus. At least, that is the case often enough to support the conclusion 
that you cannot understand what contract means by “agreement” unless 
you understand the justice component of agreement.  
The development and presentation of a structure is crucial to the 
argument here. A challenge to our current understanding of justice as a 
determinant of contract agreement is our inability to be certain that we are 
talking about the same thing when we use the same terms: What you mean 
by the word “justice”—by which I do not mean, your sense of what is 
just—may be wholly different from what I intend the term to denote (and 
connote). A structure helps us assure that we are talking about the same 
thing (or make sense of our conversation when we are not). Also, once we 
identify law (or rule), Law, and the justice calculus in the structure, we can 
better investigate the relationship among them. It is a thesis of this Essay 
that the relationship among laws, Law, and the justice calculus may tell us 
more than would simply crafting definitions of each in isolation from the 
other two.  
The ultimate conclusion here is that, notwithstanding its invocation of 
justice, contract (and perhaps all of Law) is essentially amoral; that is, 
there is no such thing as a fixed “morality” that can matter in the way Law, 
specifically the contract law, governs transactor interrelations. That is not 
to say that there is no such thing as morality. There may well be a 
phenomenon or network of phenomena that is best described as morality, 
but that is another thing altogether from saying that that phenomenon or 
those phenomena can have currency in the sphere of “legal morality”—the 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss2/2
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confluence of the coordination, expertise, and efficiency interests that 
justify Law.14 I use “legal morality” to describe the moral purposes Law 
serves.15 What is crucial about the concept for present purposes, though, is 
that legal morality pertains only in the case of a relation between or among 
two or more subjects of Law. Morality simpliciter would pertain no less in 
the case of an individual actor. Legal morality is a corporate concept that 
operates just in case coordination, expertise, and efficiency considerations 
are in play.  
The objects here are, admittedly, ambitious, and the course of the 
argument must effect a certain consilience16 to support the observations 
about contract agreement offered. Extant positive legal theories are not up 
to the task.17 They just reveal the incongruities without describing their 
sources. To make more sense of the Law of contract agreement, it is 
necessary to invoke conceptions of our encounter with data generally and 
then to formulate an explanation of what it is that we “see” when we 
 14. In order to grasp what “legal morality” is, it is best to start by positing a reason for Law. That 
is, why is Law necessary? Would we need Law if all men and women were angels? What is it that Law 
adds to the admonition “do the right thing”? Answers are offered by Larry Alexander and Emily 
Sherwin: “If . . . men were angels . . . then posited norms in the form of determinate rules would be 
necessary to implement morality. Formalistic law is a solution to a cognitive, not a motivational, 
problem.” LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, THE RULES OF RULES 232 n.4 (2001). In support 
of that conclusion, Alexander and Sherwin cite Gregory S. Kavka. See id. (citing Gregory S. Kavka, 
Why Even Morally Perfect People Would Need Government, 12 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 1 (1995)). “Legal 
morality” as used here captures what Alexander and Sherwin understand to be the role of 
“authoritative settlement,” which “solves the problems of coordination, expertise, and efficiency.” Id. 
 15. Cf. Raz’s “normal justification thesis”: 
The normal and primary way to establish that a person should be acknowledged to have 
authority over another person involves showing that the alleged subject is likely better to 
comply with reasons which apply to him (other than the alleged authoritative directives) if he 
accepts the directives of the alleged authority as authoritatively binding, and tries to follow 
them, than if he tries to follow the reasons which apply to him directly. 
RAZ, supra note 9, at 214 (footnote omitted). 
 16. Edward O. Wilson explains the term “consilience”: “William Whewell, in his 1840 synthesis 
The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, was the first to speak of consilience, literally a ‘jumping 
together’ of knowledge by the linking of facts and fact-based theory across disciplines to create a 
common groundwork of explanation.” EDWARD O. WILSON, CONSILIENCE: THE UNITY OF 
KNOWLEDGE 8 (1998). The syntheses of law and economics, law and psychology, “neurophilosophy,” 
and “neuroeconomics” would be examples of consilience, efforts to find answers in the coincidence of 
theory. 
 17. See, e.g., LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE (2002) (arguing 
for assessment of legal policies solely on the basis of their effect on individual welfare, without regard 
to fairness); Richard Craswell, In That Case, What Is the Question? Economics and the Demands of 
Contract Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 903 (2003) (abandoning descriptive analysis of contract theory in 
favor of normative analysis); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. 
REV. 961, 967 (2001) (arguing for assessment of legal policies solely on the basis of their effect on 
individual welfare, without regard to fairness); Posner, Success or Failure?, supra note 5, at 880 
(stating that economic analysis of contract law has failed, but declining to recommend a superior 
approach). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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encounter a legal rule. The consilience accomplished here takes advantage 
of contributions to our understanding of cognitive theory generally as well 
as our developing appreciation of the “complex.” 
Part I of the Essay will offer an account of five contracts cases that 
concern the nature of agreement: Hadley v. Baxendale,18 Jacob & Youngs, 
Inc. v. Kent,19 Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co.,20 Henningsen v. 
Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,21 and Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc.22 While that is 
not to say that those five cases determine agreement fully and completely, 
it is to say that we cannot understand what agreement in contract means 
unless we can account for these five cases and the fit between justice and 
agreement they present. Four of the cases expressly invoke “justice” as the 
measure or determinant of contract agreement. The fifth relies on 
“practical considerations” essentially indistinguishable from the elements 
of the “justice” calculus relied upon by the first four. The cases are not 
mined for their sense of justice. The cases reveal the contract law’s 
reliance on justice expressly, even in the course of fixing what may be one 
of its most prosaic conceptions: the agreement.23  
 18. Hadley v. Baxendale (1854), 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. Ch.). 
 19. Jacobs & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889 (N.Y. 1921). 
 20. Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co., 382 P.2d 109 (Okla. 1963). 
 21. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960). 
 22. Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 23. There are many other contexts in which the contract law relies on justice, or its cognates, to 
fix the rights of the parties rather than as an after-the-fact explanation for a decision. See, e.g., 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 86, “Promise for Benefit Received” (“extent necessary to 
prevent injustice”), 89, “Modification of Executory Contract” (“if the modification is fair and 
equitable”; “to extent that justice requires enforcement”), 139, “Enforcement by Virtue of Action in 
Reliance” (“The remedy granted for breach is to be limited as justice requires”), 158, “Relief Including 
Restitution” (“grant relief on such terms as justice requires”), 173, “When Abuse of a Fiduciary 
Relation Makes a Contract Voidable” (contract voidable unless “it is on fair terms”), 176, “When a 
Threat Is Improper” (“threat is improper if the resulting exchange is not on fair terms”), 184, “When 
Rest of Agreement Is Enforceable” (“reasonable standards of fair dealing”), 190, “Promise 
Detrimental to Marital Relationship” (“fair in the circumstances”), 195, “Term Exempting from 
Liability for Harm Caused Intentionally, Recklessly or Negligently” (term unenforceable unless “fairly 
bargained for”), 205, “Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing” (pervasive duty of “good faith and fair 
dealing”), 223, “Course of Dealing” (“fairly to be regarded as establishing a common basis of 
understanding”), 243, “Effect of a Breach by Non-Performance as Giving Rise to a Claim for Damages 
for Total Breach” (such impairment of value of contract to injured party “that it is just in the 
circumstances to allow him to recover”), 260, “Application of Payments Where Neither Party 
Exercises his Power” (“just regard to the interests of third persons, the debtor and the creditor”), 272, 
“Relief Including Restitution” (if other apposite rules “will not avoid injustice, the court may grant 
relief on such terms as justice requires”), 351, “Unforeseeability and Related Limitations on Damages” 
(“court may limit damages . . . if it concludes that in the circumstances justice so requires”), 354, 
“Interest as Damages” (“interest may be allowed as justice requires”), 358, “Form of Order and Other 
Relief” (“order of specific performance . . . on such terms as justice requires”), 371, “Measure of 
Restitution Interest” (measurement of restitution interest “as justice requires”), 384, “Requirement 
That Party Seeking Restitution Return Benefit” (compensation in place of return of property in 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss2/2
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That brief exposition of five seminal contract agreement cases will 
demonstrate the salience of justice in recurring agreement contexts: We 
have come to understand contract’s central agreement doctrine by direct 
reference to justice as a tool of analysis, not simply as a trope we might 
apply after the fact to signify our concurrence with a more fundamental 
analytical criterion. The cases, we will see, do not simply admonish the 
next court to do what is just or to reach the result consistent with justice. 
Instead, they hold that the very contours of the parties’ agreement is 
determined by justice. So in order to formulate that agreement, you must 
appreciate what terms justice would require. The contract law, then, can be 
no more accessible to us than can be the conception of justice, and is every 
bit as subject to idiosyncrasy as our conceptions of justice. Part I presents 
the five crucial cases to make clear the role of justice in contract 
agreement in order to support the analysis that follows of the structure of 
the justice calculus: what we can mean when we describe a result as 
consistent with the dictates of justice. 
Justice (as perhaps all constituents of legal doctrine) is the product of 
cognition. Part II of the Essay first describes a conception of cognitive 
theory that explains well how we encounter data, including legal doctrine, 
subject to pervasive heuristic limitations. Our every encounter with data is 
determined by our prior encounters with data, which ultimately determine 
what we understand to be our perspective. Our perspectives are dynamic 
and shift as we are subject to data, and we are constantly bombarded by 
additional data: We never stand in the same river twice.24 Over time, 
certainly, our perspectives become more fixed and more difficult to shift, 
much as an automobile’s fuel efficiency gauge varies more markedly when 
fewer miles have been traveled than it does after many more miles have 
been traveled, and just as we learn more in the first year of life than we 
will ever learn thereafter. Cognitive theory offers an account of our 
encounter with data and the idiosyncrasies of perception that nonetheless 
conspire to reveal sufficient consensus for cooperative action, the object of 
Law. Conceptions of cognition, essentially how we process the constant 
onslaught of data, can tell us something about how we encounter the data 
restitution “if justice requires that compensation be accepted”) (emphases added). So “justice” as an 
analytical device may be a key to much more of contract than we have always appreciated. But the 
execution of the argument of this Essay is not dependent on more than justice as a determinant of 
agreement in the five seminal cases surveyed. 
 24. A common paraphrase of Heraclitus, who actually said: “We step and do not step into the 
same rivers, we are and we are not.” Homeric Questions 24.3-5, in EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY 117 
(Jonathan Barnes trans. & ed., 1987). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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that is and that becomes Law—for present purposes, the contract 
agreement law.  
Part II then builds on that cognitive theory to offer a depiction of legal 
rules (the laws that determine, at least in part, what Law is) and describes 
our engagement with them in terms of complexity theory. The description 
demonstrates something important about the nature of legal doctrine (here, 
contract agreement law). I argue that the structure of legal doctrine may be 
revealed by the same cellular automata complexity theorists use to depict 
the elaboration of rules in nature. That is not to say that a legal rule is 
determined in the same way as might be the “pattern” of cells that account 
for the appearance of natural phenomena (a flower or an animal’s 
markings), but it is to suggest that the analogy to complexity theory’s 
demonstration in cellular automata may offer a useful reconception of 
legal doctrine and the relationship between doctrine and what we mean by 
“justice.”  
The second Part concludes by offering a synthesis of cognitive and 
complexity theory in terms of the contract law of agreement, and the 
Conclusion of the Essay suggests the answers that might be provided by 
the structure as well as the questions that remain. The object is to make 
more concrete the justice calculus in the case of contract agreement, and 
the possibility is left open that the structure developed may pertain as well 
to other analytical settings in Law. The emergent structure is a first step, 
but an important one.  
For clarity’s sake, it is worthwhile to present the course of the Essay’s 
argument at the outset: 
1. “Agreement” is a crucial constituent of contract. 
2. In important and recurring contract contexts, the existence and 
extent of contract agreement is determined by reference to a justice 
calculus. 
3. Justice is the product of cognition, in much the same way as our 
perceptions generally are the product of cognitive processes (heuristic 
theory). 
4. Pattern formation and recognition are idiosyncratic (perception).  
5. Cognitive processes rely on pattern recognition and conclusions 
drawn from the coincidence and dissonance of cognitive patterns (heuristic 
function). 
6. Legal doctrine is determined by heuristic consensus (consensus). 
7. Complexity theory may depict progress of a rule through its 
elaboration by the use of cellular automata.  
8. Cellular automata demonstrate that complex forms emerge from 
simple initial rules. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss2/2
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9. Legal doctrine may be appreciated as such elaboration of simple 
rules.  
10. The structures revealed by cellular automata in complexity theory 
provide the means to depict the evolution of legal doctrine both over time 
and across populations. 
11. The form of the doctrine that emerges from the justice calculus in 
contract agreement may be depicted in complexity theory’s cellular 
automata. 
12. Understood as a polytypic concept, legal doctrine may coalesce into 
Law, or it may not.  
13. Legal doctrine so conceived may support reconceptualization of the 
relationships that determine related contract doctrines and the progress of 
contract doctrines’ evolution. 
I. CONTRACT AGREEMENT 
Agreement is the foundation of contract; indeed, it may be that 
agreement alone is what determines contract, the law of consensual 
relations, from other areas of the Law. The Uniform Commercial Code 
defines “agreement” as “the bargain of the parties in fact.”25 Section 3 of 
the Restatement of Contracts is similarly succinct: “An agreement is a 
manifestation of mutual assent on the part of two or more persons.”26 The 
inquiry under both formulations is essentially factual: Did the parties’ 
minds “meet,” an ostensibly objective inquiry with necessarily subjective 
determinants. We cannot, after all, look into the parties’ minds; we can 
only infer what we can infer from their statements and actions attending 
the (asserted) manifestation of intent.  
“Agreement” in the contract law is in fact a device, a tool for courts to 
vindicate particular notions of party autonomy while maintaining, at least 
apparently, the consensual basis of contract liability. The cases described 
 25. U.C.C. § 1-201 (3) (2003) [hereinafter “U.C.C.” or “Code”]. The definition of agreement 
reads more fully, in pertinent part: “‘Agreement’ . . . means the bargain of the parties in fact, as found 
in their language or inferred from other circumstances, including course of performance, course of 
dealing, or usage of trade . . . .” So “agreement” is a construction of facts, including what the parties 
said to one another. The language of the Code, though, nowhere explicitly provides or even suggests 
that “agreement” is the product of any kind of justice calculus. That is, the Code neither invites us to 
find agreement nor determines the parties’ agreement by reference to what would be “just.” 
 26. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 3 (1985). The same section defines “bargain” as 
“an agreement to exchange promises or to exchange a promise for a performance or to exchange 
performances.” Id. Again, the term is defined without reference to justice. In fact, a contract that is 
voided due to illegality, or that is unconscionable, can nevertheless be a bargain. See id. cmt. c. Justice 
dictates only whether the agreement will be enforced, not whether it exists. 
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in this Part are admittedly not typical of courts’ treatment of agreement. 
Each, though, is seminal and has determined our conception of contract 
agreement far more profoundly than the myriad decisions that have found 
or not found a “meeting of the minds.” Because these decisions invoke 
“justice” (in one case “practical considerations”) not just as a measure of, 
but also as a substantial constituent of agreement, the cases may tell us a 
good deal about contract’s relation to conceptions of morality generally 
and how that matters to Law.  
The cases treated here are among those most often reproduced in the 
casebooks,27 so they may have a disproportionate impact on what lawyers 
(and judges, lawmakers, and law teachers) understand agreement to be. 
They have also received considerable attention in the scholarly literature 
and have had a direct impact on the development of statutory contract law. 
The discussions of the cases take account of the impact the decisions have 
had on the contract law but focus primarily on the way each uses 
conceptions of justice to determine the substance of agreement.  
Two caveats, of a sort: First, the discussion of the cases that follows is, 
in fact, a construction of them. I do not doubt that other conscientious 
readers might reach different conclusions about the cases generally and 
specifically insofar as the justice criterion of agreement is concerned. 
None of the opinions includes an express acknowledgment that the case is 
about the contours of agreement or the relationship between conceptions 
of justice and the agreement requirement in contract. It is my conclusion 
that the cases are, ultimately, about the agreement criterion and intimate 
something important about justice as the determinant and measure of 
agreement. 
 27. A survey of eleven major contracts casebooks published since 1963 (the year of the 
Peevyhouse decision) demonstrates this. All eleven casebooks included Hadley and either Jacob & 
Youngs or Peevyhouse (eight included both Jacob & Youngs and Peevyhouse). Henningsen was 
included in seven of the eleven. See RANDY E. BARNETT, CONTRACTS: CASES AND DOCTRINE (3d ed. 
2003) (Hadley, Jacob & Youngs, and Peevyhouse); STEVEN J. BURTON, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT 
LAW (2d ed. 2001) (Hadley, Jacob & Youngs, and Peevyhouse); JOHN CALAMARI & JOSEPH PERILLO, 
CONTRACTS: CASES AND PROBLEMS (1978) (Hadley and Jacob & Youngs); MICHAEL L. CLOSEN ET 
AL., CONTRACTS: CONTEMPORARY CASES, COMMENTS, AND PROBLEMS (1984) (Henningsen, Jacob & 
Youngs, and Peevyhouse); JOHN P. DAWSON ET AL., CONTRACTS: CASES AND COMMENT (8th ed. 
2003) (all four cases); LON FULLER & MELVIN EISENBERG, BASIC CONTRACT LAW (4th ed. 1981) 
(Hadley, Henningsen, and Peevyhouse); HARRY W. JONES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
CONTRACTS (1965) (all four cases); AMY HILSMAN KASTELY ET AL., CONTRACTING LAW (1996) 
(Hadley and Jacob & Youngs); FRIEDRICH KESSLER ET AL., CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS (3d 
ed. 1986) (all four cases); JOHN E. MURRAY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS (1969) (all four 
cases); ROBERT SCOTT & DOUGLAS LESLIE, CONTRACT LAW & THEORY (2d ed. 1993) (all four 
cases). 
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Second, the structure that emerges from Part II of the Essay does not 
support any reconciliation of the cases and so does not entail 
reconsideration of the cases in light of that structure. The object is not to 
fashion a structure that “makes sense” of disparate decisions. (Indeed, I do 
not find anything disparate about the holdings.) Instead, the structure 
reveals how the necessary idiosyncrasy and therefore variety of justice 
conclusions supports what we determine to be doctrine in this one discrete 
area of the contract law.  
The point of the exegeses in Part I is to demonstrate the ubiquity of a 
justice criterion in the contract agreement calculus. A collateral, but no 
less important, conclusion of the Essay’s construction of the cases is that, 
to the extent contract is based on agreement and agreement is subject to 
the dynamic described in Part II, the foundation of contract may be less 
substantial than we generally (are wont to) maintain that it is. While the 
consequences for the Law of that conclusion are not pursued here, it 
suggests an area for further worthwhile study. 
A. Hadley v. Baxendale 
Among the most famous of English decisions that have shaped the 
American common law, Hadley v. Baxendale28 is, I argue, as much about 
“agreement” generally as it is about consequential damages specifically, 
though it is as a source of the consequential damages law that Hadley has 
attracted the most attention.29 
The facts of Hadley are not difficult to grasp, and are timeless in their 
way.30 The owner of a mill entered into a contract with a shipper for the 
transport of a broken shaft to another city where the broken shaft was to be 
used as the model for a replacement.31 The mill would be shut down until 
the new shaft could be obtained and installed.32 It is unclear whether (or, at 
least, the extent to which) the shipper was aware that the mill was shut 
 28. Hadley v. Baxendale, (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Exch. Div.). 
 29. See, e.g., Barry E. Adler, The Questionable Ascent of Hadley v. Baxendale, 51 STAN. L. REV. 
1547 (1999); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Principle of Hadley v. Baxendale, 80 CAL. L. REV. 563 
(1992); Arthur G. Murphey, Jr., Consequential Damages in Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods and the Legacy of Hadley, 23 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 415 (1989); Paul S. Turner, 
Consequential Damages: Hadley v. Baxendale Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 SMU L. 
REV. 655 (2001). See also U.C.C. § 2-715(2) cmt. 2, 3 (2003) (statutory provision of Hadley rule). 
 30. “Hadley v. Baxendale is still, and presumably always will be, a fixed star in the 
jurisprudential firmament.” GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 83 (1974). 
 31. Hadley, 156 Eng. Rep. at 146. 
 32. Id. 
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down as a result of the broken shaft.33 There was delay in delivery, and the 
owner of the mill sued to recover damages on account of the extended shut 
down of the mill.34  
Part of the problem with Hadley is the inconsistency between the 
statement of facts and the court’s opinion: It would seem from one report 
of the facts that the owner had made the shipper aware of the 
consequences of delay—shut-down of the mill and attendant loss of 
profits.35 The court, though, seemed not to have been convinced that the 
shipper was put on such notice.36 In any event, the Hadley statement of 
law is clear: 
Where two parties have made a contract which one of them has 
broken, the damages which the other party ought to receive in 
respect of such breach of contract should be such as may fairly and 
reasonably be considered either arising naturally, i.e., according to 
the usual course of things, from such breach of contract itself, or 
such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the 
contemplation of both parties, at the time they made the contract, as 
the probable result of the breach of it. Now, if the special 
circumstances under which the contract was actually made were 
communicated by [the mill owner] to [the shipper], and thus known 
to both parties, the damages resulting from the breach of such 
contract, which they would reasonably contemplate, would be the 
amount of injury which would ordinarily follow from a breach of 
contract under these special circumstances so known and 
communicated. But, on the other hand, if these special 
circumstances were wholly unknown to the party breaking the 
contract, he, at the most, could only be supposed to have had in his 
contemplation the amount of injury which would arise generally, 
 33. Id. at 146–47. 
 34. Id. at 147. 
 35. Eisenberg, supra note 29, at 570–71:  
When the contract in that case was made, the plaintiffs’ employee told Pickford’s clerk that 
the mill was stopped and that the shaft must be sent immediately. Certainly any reasonable 
person in the clerk’s position would have thought that these words were related . . . . The 
result in the case was at odds with the very rules the court laid down. 
 36. The opinion included this factual conclusion: 
Now, if the special circumstances under which the contract was actually made were 
communicated by the plaintiffs to the defendants [liability for consequential damages would 
arise] . . . . Now, in the present case . . . the only circumstances here communicated by the 
plaintiffs to the defendants at the time the contract was made, were, that the article to be 
carried was the broken shaft of a mill, and that the plaintiffs were the millers of that mill. 
156 Eng. Rep. at 151. 
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and in the great multitude of cases not affected by any special 
circumstances, from such breach of contract. For, had the special 
circumstances been known, the parties might have specially 
provided for the breach of contract by special terms as to the 
damages in that case ; [sic] and of this advantage it would be very 
unjust to deprive them.37 
Section 351 of the Second Restatement of Contracts formulates the 
Hadley rule in terms that make clear its reliance on conceptions of 
“justice”: 
(1) Damages are not recoverable for loss that the party in breach did 
not have reason to foresee as a probable result of the breach when 
the contract was made. 
(2) Loss may be foreseeable as a probable result of a breach because 
it follows from the breach 
 (a) in the ordinary course of events, or 
 (b) as a result of special circumstances, beyond the ordinary 
course of events, that the party in breach had reason to know. 
(3) A court may limit damages for foreseeable loss by excluding 
recovery for loss of profits, by allowing recovery only for loss 
incurred in reliance, or otherwise it if concludes that in the 
circumstances justice so requires in order to avoid disproportionate 
compensation.38 
In the Restatement, then, justice is a measure of recovery insofar as it 
may constrain recovery and insofar as the court will determine 
foreseeability on an objective basis. More on this below. 
The Hadley result is codified in Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code: “[Seller shall be liable to buyer for] any loss resulting from general 
or particular requirements and needs of which the seller at the time of 
contracting had reason to know . . . .”39 The fact and extent of the seller’s 
 37. Id. (emphasis added). 
 38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 351 (1981) (emphasis added). While subsection 
(3) is certainly not a strict restatement of the Hadley rule, for present purposes it suffices that the 
Restatement builds in this way on the Hadley result. 
 39. U.C.C. § 2-715(2) (2003). The provision only expressly provides the seller a means to limit 
its liability for consequential damages, though buyers too could be liable for lost profits, a form of 
consequential damage. Under existing Article 2 law, a seller may not have direct statutory license to 
recover “consequential damages” as such. JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM 
COMMERCIAL CODE § 7-16(b) (5th ed. 2000). Nevertheless, by permitting recovery for lost profits, 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p471 Alces book pages.doc11/18/2005  
 
 
 
 
 
484 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 83:471 
 
 
 
 
 
 
liability for consequential rather than direct loss40 is fixed (1) by the 
parties’ actual, express agreement (the parties are certainly able to agree 
expressly that the seller will be liable for a buyer’s particular 
consequential loss—e.g., additional shipping cost) or (2) by inference 
from the facts surrounding the transaction. It is that second basis of 
consequential loss recovery that invokes the justice calculus. The 
Restatement subsection 351(3) construction of the Hadley rationale is that 
in some circumstances providing the buyer recovery for all foreseeable 
consequential loss would be “unjust.” To the extent, then, that the Hadley 
formulation provides the court a means to determine the quantum of 
consequential loss compensable by reference to what is “just,” the decision 
fixes agreement by reference to justice. 
Under Hadley, damages are recoverable to the extent they were 
“foreseeable.”41 “Foreseeability” is not binary: The conception captures 
instead a continuum. It is the degree of foreseeability that determines the 
quantum of damages recoverable. The calculus is similar to what we 
U.C.C. § 2-708(2) does provide consequential damage recovery for the seller. An interesting question 
arises as to the buyer’s right to contract for a limitation of these “consequential damages.” At least one 
court has enforced a contract provision expanding the seller’s remedies beyond those provided by 
§ 2-708(2). Martin v. Sheffer, 403 S.E.2d 555, 556 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991). So long as a limitation on 
damages under § 2-708(2) is reasonable and in good faith, it is difficult to see why such a provision 
should not be equally enforceable. See U.C.C. § 1-302 (2003) (parties may vary from default 
provisions of U.C.C. by agreement). 
 Insofar as the Restatement recognizes the courts’ power to limit consequential damages on 
account of lost profits, it would seem that a court would have the means to afford the buyer the same 
protection as § 2-715(2) expressly provides the seller. Cf. Ian Ayres, Three Proposals to Harness 
Private Information in Contract, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 135, 139–42 (1997) (urging extension 
of the Hadley rule in order to protect buyers by forcing sellers to provide them information concerning 
seller’s lost profit exposure).  
 For other Code formulations of consequential damage rules, see U.C.C. § 2A-520(2) 
(consequential damages resulting from lessor’s default include loss from requirements of which lessor 
“at the time of contracting had reason to know and which could not reasonably be prevented”); U.C.C. 
§ 3-411(b) (person asserting right to enforce unpaid cashier’s or teller’s check “may recover 
consequential damages if the obligated bank refuses to pay after receiving notice of particular 
circumstances giving rise to the damages”); U.C.C. § 4-402 (payor bank is liable to customer for 
damages proximately caused by wrongful dishonor of check); U.C.C. § 5-111(b) (no consequential 
damages for wrongful dishonor of draft or demand on letter of credit); U.C.C. § 9-625(b) (person 
failing to comply with Article 9 may be liable for loss resulting from “debtor’s inability to obtain, or 
increased costs of, alternative financing”). 
 40. The distinction between consequential and direct damages may be one of degree. Both must 
be caused by the breach, but direct damages are said to be a necessary result of the breach, while 
consequential damages are a natural, but not a necessary, result. Applied Data Processing, Inc. v. 
Burroughs Corp., 394 F. Supp. 504 (D. Conn. 1975). See also Rexnord Corp. v. DeWolff Boberg & 
Assoc., 286 F.3d 1001, 1004 (7th Cir. 2002) (difference between direct and consequential damages lies 
in degree to which damages are a foreseeable consequence of breach). 
 41. Hadley v. Baxendale, (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 147–48 (Exch. Div.). 
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encounter in the tort cases so far as proximate cause is concerned.42 Judge 
Cardozo put it well: “The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty 
to be obeyed, and risk imports relation.”43 Just as duty is a relative 
conception, the foreseeability of consequential loss is similarly a function 
of the parties’ relation and the circumstances attending the transaction: 
constituents of a justice criterion. 
It is to be noted that the test, as it is usually stated is, objective. The 
extent of the recovery is to be measured, not by what the defendant 
actually foresaw when he made the contract, but by what a 
hypothetical, reasonable person in the position of the defendant, 
with the defendant’s knowledge of the circumstances surrounding 
the transaction, could reasonably have been expected to foresee, had 
he directed his attention to the effect of a breach.44 
Professor (and then University Chancellor) John Murray’s formulation 
of the Hadley rule suggests two constituents of the consequential damages 
calculus pertinent here: First, a court would award consequential damages 
to the “extent” that the claimed damages were foreseeable,45 and, second, 
the particular defendant’s state of mind is not determinative (though it 
might be probative); it is the reasonable person in the defendant’s position 
whose state of mind would be construed to fix the extent of that 
consequential recovery.46 So the parties’ agreement is determined by 
 42. See, e.g., Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp., 673 F.2d 951, 958 (7th Cir. 1982) (Hadley rule 
“corresponds to” tort principles limiting liability “to the foreseeable consequence of the defendant’s 
carelessness”); United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (duty of care is 
expressed as probability of harm multiplied by gravity of harm, compared with burden of taking 
adequate precautions); Neering v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 50 N.E.2d 497, 502 (Ill. 1943) (duty of care arises 
when danger is known or should be known to the defendant); Hale v. Stoughton Hosp. Ass’n, 376 
N.W.2d 89, 95 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985) (like tort damages, contract damages are limited by foreseeability 
at the time of contract formation). 
 43. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y. 1928). 
 44. JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 120, at 785 (4th ed. 2001) 
(emphasis added). 
 45. See, e.g., Askari v. R & R Land Co., 225 Cal. Rptr. 285, 289 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) 
(consequential damages available “to the extent they were reasonably foreseeable at the time of 
contracting”) (quoting Jensen v. Dalton, 9 Cal. App. 3d 654, 658 (Ct. App. 1970)); Hydraform 
Products Corp. v. Am. Steel & Aluminum Corp., 498 A.2d 339, 345–46 (N.H. 1985) (recovery for lost 
profits for sale of stoves available to the extent foreseeable); Osborn v. Commanche Cattle Indus., 545 
P.2d 827, 832 (Okla. Civ. App. 1975) (recovery of lost profits is limited by extent of injured party’s 
expectation interest). 
 46. Kerr S.S. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 157 N.E. 140, 142 (N.Y. 1927) (“[W]hatever a carrier 
could ascertain by diligent inquiry as to the nature of the undisclosed transaction, this he should be 
deemed to have ascertained, and charged with damages accordingly.”); Brown v. S.C. Ins. Co., 324 
S.E.2d 641, 646–47 (S.C. Ct. App. 1984) (consequential damages in insurance contract are based on 
what a reasonable person in insurer’s position “could have reasonably foreseen”), rev’d on other 
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reference to justice, and what is just is determined by reference to an 
objective standard. Subjective meeting of the mind “agreement” has 
nothing to do with it. 
Hadley, then, is about “agreement” and ascertaining agreement by 
reference to justice.  
B. Jacob & Youngs v. Kent 
Jacob & Youngs is an opinion written by Justice (then Judge) Benjamin 
Cardozo, and one of those for which the jurist is famous.47 Plaintiff 
contractor used a brand of pipe other than that specifically required by the 
contract for construction of a residence.48 In fact, the pipe plaintiff used 
was in all ways (but brand name) identical to the “Reading” Pipe for 
which defendant contracted.49 Defendant’s architect directed plaintiff to 
remove the nonconforming pipe and replace it with the Reading Pipe.50 
Removal would have required breaking through walls.51  
Jacob & Youngs, at one level, concerns the difference between 
“conditions” and “promises.” Failure of a condition could effect a 
forfeiture; breach of promise gives rise to an action for damages.52 
Considerations partly of justice and partly of presumable intention 
are to tell us whether this or that promise shall be placed in one 
class or in another [promise or condition]. . . . There will be 
harshness sometimes and oppression in the implication of a 
condition when the thing upon which labor has been expended is 
incapable of surrender . . . and equity and reason in the implication 
of a like condition when the subject-matter, if defective, is in shape 
grounds, Charleston County Sch. Dist. v. State Budget & Control Bd., 437 S.E.2d 6 (S.C. 1993). 
 47. Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889 (N.Y. 1921). 
 48. Id. at 890. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. The primary distinction between a promise and a condition is that failure to perform a 
promise breaches a contract, while non-occurrence of a condition does not. Non-occurrence of a 
condition, unless excused, will discharge a duty, but it does not give rise to a right to relief. JOHN D. 
CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 11.9 (5th ed. 2003); MURRAY, supra 
note 44, § 99. See also 13 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 38:5 (4th ed. 2000) (promise is a 
manifestation of intent to act or refrain from acting in a certain way; condition is an event which must 
occur before performance on a contract becomes due). An independent promise must be performed 
even though the other party has not performed. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra, § 11.25. The opposite is 
true of a dependent promise. With respect to a dependent promise, the law thus creates a “constructive 
condition,” by which a party’s duty to perform is conditioned on the other party’s performance. Id. 
§ 11.12. 
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to be returned. From the conclusion that promises may not be 
treated as dependent to the extent of their uttermost minutiae 
without a sacrifice of justice, the progress is a short one to the 
conclusion that they may not be so treated without a perversion of 
intention. Intention not otherwise revealed may be presumed to hold 
in contemplation the reasonable and probable. . . . 
 Those who think more of symmetry and logic in the 
development of legal rules than of practical adaptation to the 
attainment of a just result will be troubled by a classification where 
the lines of division are so wavering and blurred. . . . The courts 
have balanced such considerations against those of equity and 
fairness, and found the latter to be the weightier.53 
For Judge Cardozo, justice will determine agreement and agreement 
will fix the right to recovery, the substance of the contract. Curiously, just 
as in Hadley, the court’s opinion seems inconsistent with the court’s report 
of the facts: “This is not to say that the parties are not free by apt and 
certain words to effectuate a purpose that performance of every term shall 
be a condition of recovery. That question is not here.”54 But the contract 
did specify Reading Pipe;55 all that was missing, apparently, was “And we 
mean it!”  
Jacob & Youngs is formulated in section 229 of the Restatement of 
Contracts: “To the extent that the non-occurrence of a condition would 
cause disproportionate forfeiture, a court may excuse the non-occurrence 
of that condition unless its occurrence was a material part of the agreed 
exchange.”56 Of course that is but one reading of Jacob & Youngs. The 
more cynical (or realistic) formulation might be: “To the extent that the 
court concludes one party is insisting on a performance the benefit of 
which would be outweighed by the detriment that performance would 
cause to the other contracting party, the court may excuse that 
performance.” Both versions are prefaced by the “to the extent” limitation, 
and it may be that the second captures better what Judge Cardozo 
 53. Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 129 N.E.889, 890–91 (N.Y. 1921) (emphasis added). 
 54. Id. at 891. 
 55. Id. at 890. 
 56. An illustration to this section recites the facts and holding of Jacob & Youngs. RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 229 illus. 1 (1981). Compare the First Restatement formulation: “A 
condition may be excused without other reason if its requirement (a) will involve extreme forfeiture or 
penalty, and (b) its existence or occurrence forms no essential part of the exchange for the promisor’s 
performance.” RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 302 (1932). 
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accomplished in Jacob & Youngs. It certainly more candidly 
acknowledges what Judge Cardozo was doing with (to) the parties’ intent.  
The case makes an important statement about the limits of contract law 
generally. Insofar as the court was unwilling to enforce the parties’ 
agreement as formulated by them, instead relying on a fictional (though 
certainly plausible) inferred agreement, Jacob & Youngs is, in a real way, 
a watershed: Even in the face of certain contract language, and without 
any evidence of overreaching, “agreement” is constrained and ultimately 
determined by reference to justice. 
As such a watershed, the holding of Jacob & Youngs is somewhat 
shocking to the conscience of the conscientious jurist, and so it is not 
surprising that Judge Cardozo, the unsurpassed judicial rhetorician, 
included dictum that would both make his conclusion more palatable—
seem less revolutionary—and provide later courts a “trap door” to avoid 
confronting the justice calculus: “This is not to say that the parties are not 
free by apt and certain words to effectuate a purpose that performance of 
every term shall be a condition of recovery. That question is not here.”57 
And that is precisely the language that has provided refuge for courts 
discomfitted by Judge Cardozo’s reliance on justice unadorned. Two 
relatively recent cases illustrate the point.58 
The same New York Court of Appeals in Oppenheimer & Co. v. 
Oppenheim, Appel, Dixon & Co.59 considered a situation where a 
contractual provision explicitly required a landlord’s “written consent to 
certain ‘tenant work,’” and the plaintiff had provided only oral notice.60 
The plaintiff relied on Jacob & Youngs to try to circumvent the writing 
requirement, but the court was unmoved and used Judge Cardozo’s trap 
door to insist upon the strict performance of the express provision.61 The 
Oppenheimer court reinforced its conclusion by noting that the plaintiff 
had conferred no benefit on the defendant so there was no issue of 
forfeiture.62 Insofar as the court found no issue of forfeiture, there really 
was no clearly formulated justice conundrum. The fabric of justice would 
only be strained in cases of forfeiture or something close to it.63  
 57. Jacob & Youngs, 129 N.E. at 891. 
 58. See generally Hardin, Rodriguez & Boivin Anesthesiologists Ltd. v. Paradigm Ins. Co., 962 
F.2d 628 (7th Cir. 1992); Oppenheimer & Co. v. Oppenheim, Appel, Dixon & Co., 660 N.E.2d 415 
(N.Y. 1995). 
 59. Oppenheimer, 660 N.E.2d 415 (N.Y. 1995). 
 60. Id. at 416. 
 61. Id. at 420. 
 62. Id. at 419. 
 63. Id. at 420. 
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Hardin, Rodriguez & Boivin Anesthesiologists, Ltd. v. Paradigm 
Insurance Co. likewise relied upon Judge Cardozo’s trap door in a case 
between a medical professional corporation and a malpractice insurer.64 
The insurer had not strictly complied with the prerequisite terms to the 
medical corporation’s obligation to pay the insurance premium, but 
nonetheless pressed a claim based on substantial performance.65 The court 
acknowledged that the substantial performance doctrine is normally 
applied in building contracts and operates to avoid a forfeiture where the 
defect is “both trivial and innocent.”66 The court understood the doctrine to 
be inapplicable in the case of an explicit condition precedent67 and 
reasoned that Judge Cardozo “realized that the doctrine [of substantial 
performance] did not extend to cases like the one before us, where the 
plaintiff insisted upon strict compliance with its conditions and has never 
waived them. . . .”68 Now it is difficult to see how the owner in Jacob & 
Youngs was any less insistent upon Reading Pipe than the plaintiff in 
Hardin, Rodriguez was upon receiving the financial statement. The 
Hardin, Rodriguez plaintiff did not say “and, we mean it” either. But the 
court was able to reach the conclusion it reached in Hardin, Rodriguez 
without effecting a forfeiture, and that is probably what mattered. 
Forfeiture would be an injustice. The agreement was just insofar as its 
enforcement would not effect a forfeiture.  
Jacob & Youngs too is about agreement.69 
 64. Hardin, Rodriguez & Boivin Anesthesiologists, Ltd. v. Paradigm Ins. Co., 962 F.2d 628 (7th 
Cir. 1992). 
 65. Id. at 632. 
 66. Id. at 636 (quoting Jacobs & Young, Inc. v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889 (N.Y. 1921)). 
 67. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 237 cmt. d (1981)):  
If, however, the parties have made an event a condition of their agreement, there is no 
mitigating standard of materiality or substantiality applicable to the non-occurrence of that 
event. If, therefore, the agreement makes full performance a condition, substantial 
performance is not sufficient and if relief is to be had under the contract, it must be through 
the excuse of the non-occurrence of the condition to avoid forfeiture. 
 68. Hardin, Rodriguez, 962 F.2d at 636. 
 69. Courts continue to cite Jacob & Youngs in the context of determining whether a condition 
was part of (or was material to) an agreement. See, e.g., Udjur v. Thompson, 878 P.2d 180, 183 (Idaho 
Ct. App. 1994) (language in contract regarding “cutoff date” was sufficient to demonstrate that parties 
agreed to express condition); Witmer v. Vulcan Methods, Inc., 244 N.Y.S.2d 825, 826 (Sup. Ct. 1963) 
(despite contractor’s express obligation to “waterproof” basement, literal imperviousness to water not 
within contemplation of parties); Jackson v. Richards 5 & 10, Inc., 433 A.2d 888, 895 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1981) (agreements to be strictly construed in order to avoid forfeiture; breach of express conditions of 
security agreement not material). As Oppenheimer and Hardin, Rodriguez indicate, courts also 
generally adhere to Cardozo’s aversion to forfeitures. But see Elda Arnhold and Byzantio, L.L.C. v. 
Ocean Atlantic Woodland Corp., 284 F.3d 693, 695 (7th Cir. 2002) (time-essence clause enforced 
against buyer of farmland who closed one day late, forfeiting $1.7 million). 
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C. Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co. 
This is a damages case, a relatively famous one, in which the court, it 
seems, uses agreement conceptions in order to limit the recovery to which 
plaintiff would have been entitled under the standard contract measure.70 
Once again the court formulates the agreement in terms that the parties 
clearly did not embrace in order for the court to do “justice.”71 
The lessee-defendant had breached a coal mining lease by not restoring 
the plaintiff-lessor’s property to the condition the contract required: 
“[D]efendant specifically agreed to perform certain restorative and 
remedial work at the end of the lease period.”72 The estimated cost of the 
restoration was $29,000.73 In fact, had the work been performed the 
restoration would have increased the value by about $300 more than the 
value of the property unrestored.74 The issue was whether a promisee is 
entitled to the cost of defendant’s performance ($29,000) or the value of 
that performance ($300).75 Keep in mind that this is not a case in which the 
court had to determine damages without reference to the parties’ express 
agreement regarding the defendant’s contract duty. The contract clearly 
provided that the defendant would restore the property at its own cost.76 So 
“agreement” was directly in issue.77 
The Peevyhouse court began its analysis by noting that in only one 
prior case it could find, Groves v. John Wunder Co.,78 had the court 
 70. See generally Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co., 382 P.2d 109 (Okla. 1963). 
 71. Id. at 113–14. 
 72. Id. at 111. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 112. 
 75. Peevyhouse, 382 P.2d at 111. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Indeed, Professor Ayres finds Peevyhouse to be exemplary in its disregard of the parties’ 
actual agreement in order to do justice: 
Routinely providing interpretive safe harbors would be a judicial innovation. Judicial 
opinions in contract cases almost never include this information. This failure to provide 
alternative contractual language is particularly striking where the parties have tried to contract 
around a default obligation but the court rules that their efforts were insufficient to displace 
the default. For example, in Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal-Mining Co., the litigants added 
language to a form contract, apparently in an attempt to contract around the ‘diminution in 
value’ damage measure that applies in absence of agreement to the contrary. The Oklahoma 
Supreme Court held that the contract’s additional language was not sufficient to avoid the 
‘diminution in value’ default and create ‘cost of performance’ damages instead. Even if the 
court’s substantive decision was correct, the court erred by not indicating to future contractors 
what words would be sufficient to produce a cost of performance result. 
Ayres, supra note 39, at 137 (footnotes omitted). 
 78. 286 N.W. 235 (1939). 
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awarded damages based on cost rather than value of performance.79 The 
court was unconvinced by Groves and found good reason to follow other 
authority, including Jacob & Youngs, to the effect that “‘[t]he owner is 
entitled to the money which will permit him to complete, unless the cost of 
completion is grossly and unfairly out of proportion to the good to be 
attained. When that is true, the measure is the difference in value.’”80 
The Peevyhouse court had an easier time finding apposite tort authority 
for its conclusion than it did finding contract authority.81 And the court 
invoked justice conceptions: The damages the plaintiff-lessor sought 
“would seem to be ‘unconscionable and grossly oppressive damages, 
contrary to substantial justice,’ within the meaning of [a statute that the 
court deemed determinative, though drawn from a tort setting].”82 Further,  
where, in a coal mining lease, lessee agrees to perform certain 
remedial work on the premises concerned at the end of the lease 
period, and thereafter the contract is fully performed by both parties 
except that the remedial work is not done, the measure of damages 
in an action by lessor against lessee for damages for breach of 
contract is ordinarily the reasonable cost of performance of the 
work; however, where the contract provision breached was merely 
incidental to the main purpose in view, and where the economic 
benefit which would result to lessor by full performance of the work 
is grossly disproportionate to the cost of performance, the damages 
which lessor may recover are limited to the diminution in value 
resulting to the premises because of the non-performance.83 
The court did note that if full recovery of the property was “in fact 
contemplated by the parties, and is a main or principal purpose of those 
contracting,” a plaintiff in the lessor’s position could receive damages 
measured by the cost of performance.84 It is no more clear how the lessor 
in Peevyhouse could have established that the recovery provision was not 
incidental than it is clear how the owner in Jacob & Youngs could have 
established that “Reading Pipe” means “Reading Pipe.” In both cases, the 
courts fixed the terms of the agreement in issue by reference to 
conceptions of justice. 
 79. Peevyhouse, 382 P.2d at 111–12. 
 80. Id. at 113 (quoting and citing Jacob & Youngs, 129 N.E. at 891). 
 81. Id. at 112–14. 
 82. Id. at 113 (quoting an Oklahoma statute) (emphasis added). 
 83. Id. at 114. 
 84. Id. 
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D. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors 
Henningsen is a contract case, not just a products liability case, though 
it probably has had its most significant impact as a harbinger of strict 
liability doctrine.85 The case concerns pre-Uniform Commercial Code 
sales warranty and limitation of remedy issues that have now been 
resolved by the U.C.C. in terms consistent with the Henningsen holding.86 
Part of the opinion is about abrogating the privity requirement, so that 
the consumer (or one in the consumer’s household) can bring a warranty 
action directly against the manufacturer—Mrs. Henningsen sued the 
retailer and manufacturer of a car to recover for injuries she suffered on 
account of a defect in the car which had been purchased for her as a gift by 
Mr. Henningsen.87 The court believed it was following the developing 
trend of authority: “‘The obligation of the manufacturer should not be 
based alone on privity of contract. It should rest, as was once said, upon 
“the demands of social justice.”’”88  
Henningsen had purchased a car for his wife as a Mother’s Day gift.89 
After driving it less than 500 miles, Mrs. Henningsen heard a loud noise 
under the hood, the steering wheel spun in her hands, and the car veered 
off the road.90 The car was damaged and she suffered personal injuries.91 
 85. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960). The decision’s place in the 
strict liability canon is assured: 
 In the field of products liability, the date of the fall of the citadel of privity can be fixed 
with some certainty. It was May 9, 1960, when the Supreme Court of New Jersey announced 
the decision in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc. The leaguer had been an epic one of 
more than fifty years. The sister fortress of negligence liability had fallen, after an equally 
prolonged defense, in 1916. Much sapping and mining had finally carried a whole south wing 
of the strict liability citadel, involving food and drink; and further inroads had been made into 
an adjoining area of products for what might be called intimate bodily use, such as hair dye 
and cosmetics. Heavy artillery had made no less than eight major breaches in the main wall, 
all of them still stoutly defended. 
 Then came the Henningsen case. 
William L. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791, 
791–92 (1966) (footnotes omitted). Of course, with the fall of the citadel so far as strict liability was 
concerned, some of contract was caught in the cross-fire, collateral damage we may assume. 
 86. The Code limits a seller’s ability to disclaim implied warranties by requiring the seller to 
explicitly state when she wishes to do so. If the disclaimer is in a writing, its language must be 
“conspicuous.” U.C.C. § 2-316 (2003). Revised Article 2 would also provide for extension of the 
seller’s warranty beyond the buyer to those who may reasonably be expected to “use, consume, or be 
affected by” the goods. U.C.C. § 2-318. 
 87. Henningsen, 161 A.2d at 73. 
 88. Id. at 83 (quoting and citing Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 135 P. 633, 635 (Sup. Ct. Wash. 
1913) (quoting Ketterer v. Armour, 200 F. 322, 323 (D.C.N.Y. 1912))). 
 89. Henningsen, 161 A.2d at 73. 
 90. Id. at 75. 
 91. Id. at 73, 75. 
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In response to the breach of warranty action, Chrysler, the manufacturer of 
the car, interposed, inter alia, the terms of the warranty disclaimer and 
limitation of damages provisions.92 
The plaintiff’s action was in part based on breach of warranty.93 The 
court concluded that the plaintiff had not read the portion of the sales 
contract that contained the very limited warranty and limitation of remedy 
to repair or replacement of defective parts.94 The defectiveness 
determination was to be made by the defendant-manufacturer.95 The court 
noted that the automobile industry’s “marketing practices, coupled with 
the advent of large scale advertising by manufacturers to promote the 
purchase of these goods from dealers by members of the public, provided 
a basis upon which the existence of express or implied warranties was 
predicated . . . .”96 The opinion continues: 
The terms of the warranty are a sad commentary upon the 
automobile manufacturers’ marketing practices. Warranties 
developed in the law in the interest of and to protect the ordinary 
consumer who cannot be expected to have the knowledge or 
capacity or even the opportunity to make adequate inspection of 
mechanical instrumentalities, like automobiles, and to decide for 
himself whether they are reasonably fit for the designed purpose.97 
The court also relied on decisions from other states, such as Mills v. 
Maxwell Auto Sales Corp.: “‘It would . . . be repugnant to every 
conception of justice to hold that, if the parts thus returned for examination 
were, in point of fact, so defective as to constitute a breach of warranty, 
the appellee’s right of action could be defeated by the appellant’s arbitrary 
refusal to recognize that fact. . . .’”98 And Baxter v. Ford Motor Co.:  
 92. Id. at 80. The relevant language reads:  
[The manufacturer’s] obligation under this warranty being limited to making good at its 
factory any part or parts thereof which shall, within ninety (90) days after delivery of such 
vehicle to the original purchaser or before such vehicle has been driven 4,000 miles . . . . 
[T]his warranty being expressly in lieu of all other warranties expressed or implied, and all 
other obligations or liabilities on its part, and it neither assumes nor authorizes any other 
person to assume for it any other liability in connection with the sale of its vehicles. 
Id. at 74 (emphasis supplied by court). 
 93. Id. at 73. 
 94. Id. at 74. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 77. 
 97. Id. at 78 (citing Greenland Dev. Corp. v. Allied Heating Products Co., 35 S.E.2d 801 (Va. 
1945)). 
 98. Henningsen, 161 A.2d at 79 (emphasis added) (quoting and citing Mills v. Maxwell Auto 
Sales Corp., 181 N.W. 152, 154 (Neb. 1920)). 
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“It would be unjust to recognize a rule that would permit 
manufacturers of goods to create a demand for their products by 
representing that they possess qualities which they, in fact, do not 
possess, and then, because there is no privity of contract existing 
between the consumer and the manufacturer, deny the consumer the 
right to recover if damages result from the absence of those 
qualities, when such absence is not readily noticeable.”99 
The Henningsen court retained its focus throughout the opinion: “‘The 
obligation of the manufacturer should not be based alone on privity of 
contract. It should rest, as was once said, upon “the demands of social 
justice.”’”100 And, “[a]n instinctively felt sense of justice cries out against 
such a sharp bargain.”101 The court relied on Justice Frankfurter’s opinion 
in United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.: “‘[I]s there any principle which 
is more familiar or more firmly embedded in the history of Anglo-
American law than the basic doctrine that the courts will not permit 
themselves to be used as instruments of inequity and injustice?’”102  
The court found that standardized contracts,103 such as those before it, 
resembled “a law rather than a meeting of the minds.”104 The courts are to 
 99. Id. at 81 (emphasis added) (quoting Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 12 P.2d 409, 412 (Wash. 
1932)). 
 100. Id. at 83 (emphasis added) (quoting and citing Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 135 P. 633, 635 
(Wash. 1913)). 
 101. Id. at 85 (emphasis added). 
 102. Id. at 86 (emphasis added) (quoting and citing United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 
U.S. 289, 326 (1942)). 
 103. It is worthwhile to note that the Second Restatement of Contracts deals, in section 211, 
comprehensively with the enforceability of provisions in standard form contracts: 
(1) Except as stated in Subsection (3), where a party to an agreement signs or otherwise 
manifests assent to a writing and has reason to believe that like writings are regularly used to 
embody terms of agreements of the same type, he adopts the writing as an integrated 
agreement with respect to the terms included in the writing. 
(2) Such a writing is interpreted wherever reasonable as treating alike all those similarly 
situated, without regard to their knowledge or understanding of the standard terms of the 
writing. 
(3) Where the other party has reason to believe that the party manifesting such assent would 
not do so if he knew that the writing contained a particular term, the term is not part of the 
agreement. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 (1981). 
 Section 211 concerns a matter similar to the focus of this Essay but not actually congruent. 
Subsection (3) of the Restatement provision might just be a particular elaboration of unilateral mistake 
doctrine in what would most often be the consumer setting. Cf. id. §§ 20(2), 201(2). The object of 
Section 211 is, clearly, to avoid sharp, less than scrupulous, business practices. So you could 
understand the provision as an effort to give effect to the parties’ actual intent while the agreement 
cases considered in this Essay reach conclusions diametrically opposed to the terms of the parties’ 
agreement. The court in Henningsen was not concerned with ascertaining what the Henningsens 
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“avoid injustice through application of strict common-law principles of 
freedom of contract.”105 The court was concerned that the contract “was 
[not] understandingly made,”106 and concluded,  
[i]n the context of this warranty, only the abandonment of all sense 
of justice would permit us to hold that, as a matter of law, the 
phrase “its obligation under this warranty being limited to making 
good at its factory any part or parts thereof” signifies to an ordinary 
reasonable person that he is relinquishing any personal injury claim 
that might flow from the use of a defective automobile.107 
Notwithstanding the express terms of the parties’ agreement, then, the 
court rewrote the contract to provide that the purchaser had not 
relinquished any personal injury claim that might flow from the use of the 
defective automobile. Of course, insofar as the plaintiff had not read the 
agreement, it is curious that the court should consider determinative what 
she would have thought had she read it. But the court was going to make 
the agreement for the parties, and by reference to principles of justice. 
Henningsen is noteworthy not just as a foundation of the strict liability 
law, but as a seminal case about agreement, and about how justice 
determines agreement. 
E. Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc. 
This is a very important case about agreement, how and when it is 
formed and the way we discern the terms of a “rolling contract.”108 The 
understood the terms of the contract to be, and there is no indication that the result would have been 
otherwise had the Henningsens read and understood the contract. 
 Of course, standardized forms may benefit consumers as well as commercial parties. Forms not 
only make it easier to contract; they also reduce transaction costs, which eventually leads to lower 
prices, or so the argument goes. See Carbajal v. H & R Block Tax Services, Inc., 372 F.3d 903 (7th 
Cir. 2004) (Easterbrook, J.). For worthwhile treatments of section 211, see John E. Murray, Jr., The 
Standardized Agreement Phenomena in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 
735 (1982); Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 
1173 (1983). 
 104. Henningsen, 161 A.2d at 86. 
 105. Id. at 87 (emphasis added). 
 106. Cf. id. at 91. 
 107. Id. at 93 (second emphasis added). 
 108. See Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997). See also Robert A. Hillman, 
Rolling Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 743 (2002). In the interest of full disclosure, I should note 
that I was engaged as a consultant and lobbyist by Gateway 2000, Inc. during the course of the 
deliberations surrounding revision of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code. The positions I took 
at that time and my construction of Hill in this Essay are neither consistent nor inconsistent with one 
another. The two are inapposite. See James J. White, Default Rules in Sales and the Myth of 
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opinion of Judge Easterbrook is pithy, and seems to rely more on notions 
of common sense than it does on contract doctrine, should e’er the twain 
meet.109 
The Hills brought an action to avoid the arbitration clause included in 
the terms delivered with their new Gateway computer.110 The Hills had 
never actually agreed to the arbitration provision or any other terms but 
price, quantity, and description of the goods, a computer, at the time of 
contract negotiation, when the Hills were on the phone with the Gateway 
operator ordering the computer.111 Nonetheless, Judge Easterbrook found 
that they were bound by the arbitration clause because they knew the 
computer would arrive with some terms not disclosed over the phone.112 In 
fact, it may not have mattered a good deal that the Hills were aware or 
unaware that the computer arrived with additional terms; they appear not 
to have read any of the enclosed terms anyway and so missed the term that 
required them to return the computer within thirty days if they did not 
agree to any of the “enclosed” terms (including the arbitration clause).113 
Judge Easterbrook cast his opinion in terms of “[p]ractical 
considerations”: “If the staff at the other end of the phone for direct-sales 
operations such as Gateway’s had to read the four-page statement of terms 
before taking the buyer’s credit card number, the droning voice would 
anesthetize rather than enlighten many potential buyers.”114 You could 
well imagine that the same buyer would be no more interested in reading 
enclosed terms either, and likely would not. It is the nature of our 
“contract rich” society that has anesthetized us to proliferating terms. And 
we can acknowledge, as a rule for the most part, that people do not read, 
so it does not make obvious good sense to have very much turn on 
agreement to what goes unread, and what large commercial sellers expect 
to be (and perhaps count on being) unread.  
It is one thing to acknowledge that people do not read and another to 
decide what consequences the contract law ought to have flow from the 
failure to read. Recall, had the Hills been good students of the contract 
law, they would have good reason to believe that the terms in the box, of 
which they were not made aware—terms which might be a proposal for 
Contracting Out, 48 LOY. L. REV. 53, 70–76 (2002) (describing several law professors’ representation 
of Gateway). 
 109. See generally Hill, 105 F.3d 1147. 
 110. Id. at 1148. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 1150. 
 113. Id. at 1148. 
 114. Id. at 1149. 
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modification—could not determine their contract rights. They could have 
understood that their contract rights were fixed at the time of contracting, 
when they were placing their phone order. 
It is not immediately clear why the Gateway customer service 
representative could not have disclosed on the phone both that other terms 
upon which Gateway would insist would be included in the box containing 
the computer and that by placing the order the Hills were somehow 
agreeing that if they chose not to accept the proposed modification their 
only recourse would be to return the computer to Gateway.115 Judge 
Easterbrook concluded that the burden was on the Hills to discover the 
terms, including the accept or return clause, “in advance.”116 But standard 
contract theory does come back into Judge Easterbrook’s analysis to bind 
the Hills: “By keeping the computer beyond [thirty] days, the Hills 
accepted Gateway’s offer, including the arbitration clause.”117 So 
acceptance was accomplished by silence, as the offeror, the master of the 
offer,118 could provide. 
What Judge Easterbrook leaves us with after Hill is something that 
might be described as “checkerboard contract,” a regime that relies on 
traditional contract doctrine when it suits and on “practical considerations” 
when traditional doctrine does not. This is not to criticize Judge 
Easterbrook’s analysis or conclusion; it is just to point out what Hill has 
done with “agreement” and to suggest what the case may intimate for the 
future of contract agreement. There may not be anything wrong with 
mixing doctrine and practical considerations. Indeed, the concept of 
“agreement” revealed in the other four cases considered here suggests that 
 115. That was the conclusion of the court in Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332 (D. 
Kan. 2000), decided three years after Hill. See also White, supra note 108, at 77 (“Certainly Judge 
Easterbrook would say disclosing its terms at the time of payment is unreasonable for Gateway, but 
equally likely is Judge Vratil’s conclusion [in Klocek] that such disclosures are reasonable.”). While 
Professor White was opining about how the Hill and Klocek cases might be decided under a proposed 
revision of U.C.C. § 2-207, his observation as well demonstrates the idiosyncracy of justice analyses, 
and keeps in mind that the two contrasting views are held by two federal judges. So “practical 
considerations,” insofar as both judges were taking account of them, lead to indeterminate (in these 
cases diametrically opposed) conclusions. 
 116. Hill, 105 F.3d at 1150. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Judge Vratil in Klocek was not as certain that Gateway as vendor was the master of the offer: 
“[T]he Seventh Circuit provided no explanation for its conclusion that ‘the vendor is the master of the 
offer.’ In typical consumer transactions, the purchaser is the offeror, and the vendor is the offeree.” 
Klocek, 104 F. Supp. 2d at 1340 (citations omitted). It is curious that in telephone transactions 
followed by enclosed standard terms in the 21st Century very much of consequence should turn on 
who did what to whom “first.” 
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“agreement” is constrained, if at all, by justice, and not so certainly by 
doctrinal inflexibility. 
It is the balance struck or intimated between doctrine and practicality 
that is most fascinating. For at more than one juncture had Judge 
Easterbrook relied on practicality rather than doctrine (e.g., were we 
concerned with practical considerations, we might wonder whether 
Gateway really thought the Hills would accept by silence, indeed, whether 
the Hills would read much of the paperwork included with the computer at 
all) or on doctrine rather than practicality (e.g., terms enclosed with 
computer but not disclosed at time of contracting could be only 
modifications for addition to the contract), the opposite result would have 
followed. Recognizing that Judge Easterbrook vacillated between 
practicality (“droning voice” of the operator)119 and doctrine (vendor as 
“master” of offer)120 is not to conclude that he reached an inappropriate 
conclusion, if, after all, the object is ultimately to arrive at an “agreement” 
and “agreement” connotes a justice calculus. We might be concerned with 
the predictability or lack thereof Judge Easterbrook’s approach would 
engender, but it is not obviously less predictable than the analyses in the 
other four agreement cases considered here. The contract law has always 
displayed some impatience with predictability as a basis for contract 
doctrine, anyway.121 
This Part has demonstrated, by the presentation of five seminal contract 
cases, that the substance of agreement, the “there [that is] there,” in the 
case of contracts within the scope of the five cases’ precedential scope, is 
determined by at best vaguely determinate reference to justice (and, in 
Hill, practical considerations redolent of justice). What, then, does reliance 
on justice entail, and how can we make sense of (or even predict) its 
operation in the “next case”? To approach that question, it is necessary to 
posit a sense of what we do when we bring justice to bear on a problem. 
That is not to suggest a test or definition of justice, say, “justice as 
fairness”;122 it is instead to focus on the cognitive process that a justice 
 119. Hill, 105 F.3d at 1149. 
 120. Klocek, 104 F. Supp. at 1340. 
 121. See PATRICK S. ATIYAH, PROMISES, MORALS, AND LAW 36 (1981) (“Few would today deny 
that . . . the fact that promises tend to be relied upon, that they positively invite reliance, is one of the 
chief grounds for the rule that promises should be kept, and that contracts should be legally 
enforceable.”). But see E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CHANGING YOUR MIND 39 (“It is circular to base the 
conclusion that the law should protect one’s expectation on the premise that the law does protect.”). 
 122. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 10–15 (rev. ed. 1999) (principles of justice would 
be those determined from the “original position” behind a “veil of ignorance”). 
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calculus entails so that we may concretize the justice process, if you will. 
That is the object of the next part of the Essay. 
II. CONCEPTIONS OF COGNITION  
“Justice” rests uneasily as a noun. It seems to invoke a complementary 
verb form, a sense captured, perhaps, by the idea of “doing” justice, or 
“realizing” a just result. At least that is how we must conceive of justice in 
order to appreciate how it might do the work that the cases in Part I call 
upon justice to do. Recall that in those cases justice was an analytical and 
decisional tool, not just a label imposed on a result. So to that end 
conceive of justice as process; then, allow that justice so conceived would 
contemplate a cognitive process. This part of the Essay asks and answers 
the question: If we may understand justice as a cognitive (an analytical) 
process, how might we depict that process in order to discover its 
operation in contract cases determining the contours of contract agreement 
doctrine?  
This second Part develops a structure of the cognitive and perspectival 
dynamic that defines human agency and reveals the foundation of the 
justice calculus. The formulation is throughout self-consciously attentive 
to the way human agency would need to be depicted in order to arrive at 
such a structure. Justice, as it operates in the context of contract 
agreement, is a function of human agency and Law’s relation to justice as 
the measure or determinant of contract agreement may only be appreciated 
by reference to the sense of human agency that can support the justice 
conception. That is, we must first discover where in the course of human 
events the justice sense operates. Then we will be in the position to 
suggest the relation, and ultimately the structure of a relation, between 
justice and “legal morality” in the law of contract agreement.  
The first following section presents the cognitive conclusions of 
Howard Margolis, whose identification of “patterns” of thought reveals 
the necessary idiosyncrasy that justice (and, perhaps, Law more generally) 
confronts.123 These patterns are fundamental to the conception of human 
agency that determines the contours of justice. The second section builds 
on that conception of human agency to develop a heuristic “theory of 
everything,” and demonstrates how the justice that matters to contract 
agreement doctrine depends on the incidents of “the heuristic function.” 
 123. See HOWARD MARGOLIS, PATTERNS, THINKING, AND COGNITION (1987) [hereinafter 
MARGOLIS, PATTERNS]; HOWARD MARGOLIS, PARADIGMS & BARRIERS (1993) [hereinafter 
MARGOLIS, PARADIGMS]. 
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From those premises, a structure of justice emerges and supports a 
metaphor developed from Stephen Wolfram’s contribution to complexity 
theory. Finally, this Part formulates a mechanics of justice perception that 
depicts development of legal doctrine and how it is Law as doctrine that 
describes consensus. 
A. Patterns 
Margolis sets out to explain the evaluation, even the correction, of 
scientific theory over time.124 So his object is not to describe the human 
engagement of moral questions. But if justice is a conception constrained 
by human agency, then we can agree that aspects of human agency that 
impact cognition generally as well may impact the justice calculus, which 
is a manifestation or product of cognition. The subject encounters data—
phenomena—and processes that data in order to formulate and support a 
conclusion that accommodates thriving in the circumstance.125 The 
analogy must be expanded but for now the image works: The justice 
calculus and cognition are systems that process data. 
It is not crucial that each human subject have the same sense of justice 
(the same appreciation of what is just) any more than it is necessary that 
every human subject have the same visual acuity. Both the justice sense 
and vision may be less than perfect (by reference to the metaphysically 
real) in relation to the phenomena they perceive without our needing to say 
that the inputs for different subjects are different in a way that says 
something about the data rather than the perception (cognition) of it. By 
recognizing the possibility (indeed, certainty) of diverse justice or visual 
perspectives we are not positing that the thing perceived is different.126 
We reach divergent justice conclusions in cases of contract agreement 
for some of the same reasons as, Margolis tells us, our eyes occasionally 
“play tricks on us”127—pattern recognition error—though the diversity of 
 124. The subtitle of Paradigms & Barriers is “How Habits of Mind Govern Scientific Beliefs,” 
and several chapters of that book concern the Ptolemaic and Copernican systems. See MARGOLIS, 
PARADIGMS, supra note 123. 
 125. This might describe the province of “practical reasoning.” See BRIAN H. BIX, A DICTIONARY 
OF LEGAL THEORY 162 (2004) (“An approach to morality and ethics that focuses on the reasons we 
have for and against particular actions and choices. The term often refers to or derives from Aristotle’s 
distinction between practical and speculative reasoning, with practical reasoning being tied to 
(eventual) action.”). 
 126. This far we can go with moral realism. See Michael S. Moore, Moral Reality Revisited, 90 
MICH. L. REV. 2424 (1992). 
 127. Margolis spends some time describing optical illusions as indicia of cognitive anomaly. See, 
e.g., MARGOLIS, PATTERNS, supra note 123, at 37–39. 
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justice decisions need not indicate “error”: Margolis’s interest is in making 
more salient our propensity to err, and in the case of science, to err 
intellectually. If the bases of the justice calculation are but another species 
of the same genus, thought generically as the primary predicable in this 
sense, then our propensity to conceive differently in matters intellectual—
the justice calculus—is just a particular instance of our human capacity to 
conceive differently more generally.128  
From the idea of perceptual discontinuity and idiosyncrasy, Margolis’s 
work supports analogy to the role of human agency in justice calculi. 
Pattern formation and identification are the constituents of our justice 
determinations specifically just as they are the constituents of our 
cognition generally. So in reaching justice conclusions, just as in solving a 
nonlinear equation, we rely on patterns developed in response to our 
environment as a consequence of the things that make us human.129 But, 
also, just as established perceptual patterns may make us blind to “optical 
illusions,”130 our patterns of attributes and experience may distort justice 
determinations. This is not to say that erroneous determinations are 
excused in some way, or become just “all things considered,” but it is to 
suggest that with regard to regimes—e.g., justice—that would 
superimpose morality on other rational exercise—e.g., the Law—it is 
crucial to conceptualize the existence and substance of divergent justice 
patterns.131 
Margolis’s sense of perceptual divergence relies on the necessary role 
of heuristics in cognition: “Slips in the way we perceive external objects, 
or in the way we perceive probabilities (and, more generally, in the way 
we judge logical relations) therefore invite interpretation as equivalent to 
 128. It could seem that the justice calculus is not the same type of rational process that we think of 
when we think of cognition. That is, we might conclude that logic is tighter than justice, admits more 
readily of our identifying the sources of divergence. Perhaps justice determinations are more prone to 
divergence, or discontinuity, because of the lesser certainty of the constituents of justice. Margolis’s 
analysis provides a way for us to draw the justice-rationality analogy closely by positing the familiar 
cognitive processes as subject to the same divergence from strict logic: “Apparently the brain works in 
a way that produces judgments that very often coincide with the judgments that a strictly logical 
process would produce. But (given the many exceptions) the actual process cannot be a strictly logical 
process, and perhaps not a logical process at all.” MARGOLIS, PATTERNS, supra note 123, at 20. We 
see even logical truth through a glass darkly, but that is usually good enough—consider Newtonian 
physics. Similarly, we see justice at best imperfectly; a phenomenal glimpse of justice is the best we 
can do. 
 129. See ANTONIO R. DAMASIO, DESCARTES’ ERROR: EMOTION, REASON, AND THE HUMAN 
BRAIN 260 (2000 reprint) (“Much of each brain’s circuitry, at any given moment of adult life, is 
individual and unique, truly reflective of that particular organism’s history and circumstances.”). 
 130. See supra note 127. 
 131. Cf. Kavka, supra note 14. 
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rules of thumb, which on the whole have led to good results but in certain 
situations lead to errors.”132 A consequence, then, of our necessary133 
reliance on patterns in the course of (even moral—including “justice”) 
cognition, is that we are subject to heuristic “error,” a feature of patterns’ 
heuristic function. Is such divergence even “error”? And, if it is, is such 
error “immoral”? In any event, if Margolis is right—and I believe he is—
heuristic “error” so conceived is inevitable.134  
Margolis can go even further, and does. While, he recounts, Freud and 
Nietzsche recognized “the unreliability of a person’s own account of his 
behavior and beliefs,” that “unreliability” is the norm: “[Some] 
psychologists . . . doubt that a person’s conscious reasons for his 
judgments need have anything to do with his judgments.”135 Now this 
observation and discovery of inevitable heuristic error goes further than 
behavioral decision theory’s description of cognitive bias.136 The 
behavioral decision theorist’s response to microeconomic 
consequentialism concerns the disjunction between perception and utility; 
it does not explore judgment more basically, as the product of 
idiosyncratic pattern recognition. 
 132. MARGOLIS, PATTERNS, supra note 123, at 13. 
 133. See id. at 188–97. See also ANTONIO DAMASIO, LOOKING FOR SPINOZA: JOY, SORROW, AND 
THE FEELING BRAIN 110–11 (positing an evolutionary basis of “feelings”). 
 134. Not all instances of heuristic divergence in the case of justice determinations intimate 
immorality (on the part of any of the agents) in a sense of the term “immoral” that could matter to 
legal morality. For example, if I exercise all possible (not merely all due) care in performing an action 
or forming a conclusion (perceptual or cognitive) and still harm someone or reach an inaccurate 
conclusion, we may conclude that I have erred but that my level of (extraordinary) care would 
preclude the assignment of moral blame. That is, there is a difference between “fault” and 
“culpability,” in the sense of blameworthiness and moral opprobrium. Moral realists, though, would 
need to go farther and would find immorality in any action that does not realize the morally ideal. 
[T]he justification with which persons assert moral propositions may well be (and indeed, 
presumably is) relative to the information and cognitive resources available to them. It may 
thus be justifiable for one person to defend the morality of an action while it is 
simultaneously justifiable for another (possessed of different information or cognitive 
capacities) to contest the morality of that same action . . . . [T]his claim alone is insufficient to 
dispel the thesis that moral disputes have determinate right answers. . . . [S]ince we consider 
beliefs to be justified to the extent that we think that they come close to approximating what 
is true, it is impossible to construct a theory of moral justification that does not presuppose an 
independent theory of moral truth. 
HEIDI M. HURD, MORAL COMBAT 29–30 (1999). The structure developed in this article offers a 
“theory of moral justification [in the case of justice as a measure of contract agreement] that does not 
presuppose an independent theory of moral truth.” Id. Dean Hurd’s conclusions may inform “morality” 
unmodified, but it is “legal morality” (morality at the confluence of coordination, expertise, and 
efficiency considerations) that is the focus of this study, and it is justice in terms of legal morality that 
may be captured by the structure posited here. 
 135. MARGOLIS, PATTERNS, supra note 123, at 21. 
 136. See generally SUNSTEIN, supra note 1. 
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The application of Margolis’s description of the substance and 
operation of patterns in cognitive theory to the heuristic function in justice 
determinations generally and contract agreement specifically is neither 
obvious nor, without more, sufficiently developed to support a structure. 
Margolis’s patterns are (at least a part of) the framework, but require 
elaboration in order to reveal the justice relation that may determine 
contract agreement. That is the object of the next section. 
B. Of Human Agency, Heuristic Function, and a Structure 
To reiterate: Human agents need heuristics to accommodate pattern 
recognition. We necessarily rely on “clues” from which we infer “the 
whole pattern” in order to predict the consequences of our actions and to 
reach judgments. Once we appreciate the mechanism of our communion 
with what surrounds us in terms of pattern recognition—as Margolis 
demonstrates—the relation between pattern recognition and heuristics as 
fundamental to human agency is manifest. Patterns are the bases of our 
biases, our cognitive errors, and also the triumphs of our reasoning. When 
we “correctly” identify the convergence of two or more patterns—for 
example, when we recognize something or equate two things—heuristics 
serve us; when we mistake the confluence of one pattern with another as 
necessary rather than coincidental, heuristics fail us (herein of optical 
illusions) and undermine our reasoning, no less our reasoning about 
justice. A conception of justice in the context of legal morality must build 
upon fundamental conceptions of human agency and heuristic function. 
1. Human Agency 
While justice may be more than “thought,”137 it is thought—pattern 
recognition—that makes justice as accessible to us as it can be. Further, it 
is only in terms of the accessible that justice discourse makes any sense for 
purposes of positing a structure of justice in contract agreement. Law’s 
invocation of a justice calculus depends upon the constituents of the 
patterns dictated by the heuristic function as a consequence of human 
agency. 
More concretely, think of intellectual patterns as derived from data as 
well as the connections among data, in network fashion. Reasoning, 
including a justice calculation, entails progression from one data point to 
 137. Certainly moral realists, such as Moore, think that morality has a substance independent of 
thought. See Moore, supra note 126. 
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the next along the network. The connections are the stuff of rationality and 
moral reasoning. Start with perceived phenomenon “Z” (Figure 1).138 
There may be data “a, b, c, etc.,” related in ways “1, 2, 3, etc.” for 
example. For some the perceived data are the same but the relations 
among them may be different (e.g., 4, 5, 6) and for some others the 
relations are the same but the data may be different (e.g., j, k, l instead of 
a, b, c). Either type of difference (and perhaps other types of difference) 
yields different “patterns,” in the Margolis sense.139  
FIGURE 1140 
 
 
Differences among pattern perceptions and analyses elicit different 
responses (including divergent justice conclusions) that are not necessarily 
relativistic in any sense that is inconsistent with moral realism: here, the 
conclusion that there is a just result. The differences may be in the data 
perceived (is the “x” marked (b) at level (ii) really a “(b),” in some 
noumenal sense?) not in the processing of that data (is “b” really on level 
(ii) and not level (iii)?)—leading to the ultimate and idiosyncratic justice 
conclusion (depicted at level (v)). Those perspectival and analytical 
differences are a function of idiosyncratic perceptual and analytical 
 
 
 138. Cf. MARGOLIS, PARADIGMS, supra note 123, at 110 (offering a pyramidal schematic of 
human cognitive processing). 
 139. Id. at 1–4. 
 140. Cf. MARGOLIS, PATTERNS, supra note 123, at 110 (offering a pyramidal schematic of human 
cognitive processing). 
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context: Your perceptions (represented by “y”) and mine (by “x”) never 
capture the same thing the same way, quite literally.141 (Figure 2.) While 
the moral realist will say that the reality is either your “y” or my “x” (or an 
“r” that neither of us perceives), that conclusion cannot pertain to a justice 
determination which is only concerned with the confluence of your and my 
perception, the justice determination that matters to legal morality: what 
can become doctrine. 
In order to appreciate the fundamental pervasiveness of the foregoing 
cognitive mechanism, it is worthwhile to consider further the cognitive 
power, and the imperative, of heuristic analysis. That is the subject of the 
next section. 
2. Heuristic Function 
The heuristic function assures that we see the same thing sufficiently 
similarly to accommodate our cooperative action (the “x,y” overlap in 
Figure 2), but there is still heuristic discontinuity. The patterns we each 
recognize are not the same patterns; they are simply close enough. 
Two crucial incidents of the heuristic function warrant mention: 
“discrimination,” and “leverage.” “Discrimination” refers to our ignoring 
portions of the data that can be ignored without impairing the message of 
the data (reducing the size of the data pattern to make it more 
manageable).142 “Leverage” refers to our ability (or mere propensity?) to 
focus on regularities without becoming distracted by the particulars that 
are not pertinent to the perceptual or analytical exercise.143 The 
opportunities for discontinuity among subjects’ perceptions and analyses 
 141. Cf. MARGOLIS, PARADIGMS, supra note 123, at 18: 
Each cognitive response (seeing things in a certain way on a certain occasion) is intrinsically 
an individual thing—as much so as having a headache or drinking a gulp of water. Since no 
two individuals are identical either in their makeup or their experience, no two individuals 
will share exactly the same cognitive repertoire. . . . We want to understand how what initially 
are slight variations in habits of mind and experience sometimes have remarkable 
consequences. 
Or, as we shall see, in Stephen Wolfram’s terms: how complex forms proceed from simple rules. 
 142. “[T]hose aspects of data that are not relevant for whatever purpose one has can simply be 
ignored.” STEPHEN WOLFRAM, A NEW KIND OF SCIENCE 549 (2002). 
 143. “[O]ne can avoid explicitly having to specify every element in the data by making use of 
regularities that one sees.” Id. The ability to perceive regularities is a cognitive skill: “[W]e know that 
when we find regularities, it implies that redundancy is present, and this in turn means that a shorter 
description can be given. So when we say that we cannot recognize any regularities, this is equivalent 
to saying that we cannot find a shorter description.” Id. at 552. This is a form of leveraging because 
enhanced perceptual (intellectual) acuity means that the human agent both has less data to process and 
greater ability to process it. 
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engendered by discrimination and leverage reveals the necessary 
incongruities among actors’ reactions to data. The goal of perception and 
analysis is heuristic—summarization—but the necessary consequence is 
discontinuity (i.e., divergent justice conclusions) and that discontinuity 
may result either from differences in the sensory input (the data) or in the 
processing of the same data (perceptual and analytical acuity) or both. 
FIGURE 2 
 
In contexts where the patterns are close enough in relation to the 
perceptual conclusion we need to reach to cooperate (indicated by the 
overlapping “xy’s”), we recognize convention, a point of sufficient social 
agreement: i.e., we will agree that the circumstances reveal the justice that 
establishes contractual agreement. “Close enough” is, after all, good 
enough with regard to horse shoes and hand grenades, though not in 
neurosurgery—but still it is all a matter of degree of acuity, of “coarse 
graininess.”144 (Indeed, at some nano-level, we might imagine, close 
enough is good enough in neurosurgery.) “Close enough” in one case may 
not be “close enough” in the next. 
In the case of individual (and individuals’) justice conclusions that 
there is or is not contract agreement on particular facts, an implicit 
assumption is that we perceive the same data sets in reaching those 
corporate conclusions. And our perceptual and analytical faculties  
 
 
 144. See MURRAY GELL-MANN, THE QUARK AND THE JAGUAR 29 (1994) (“[W]hen defining 
complexity it is always necessary to specify a level of detail up to which the system is described, with 
finer details being ignored. Physicists call that ‘coarse graining.’”). 
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[a]re continually bombarded by huge amounts of data, in the form 
of images, sounds, and so on. To be able to make use of this data we 
must reduce it to more manageable proportions. And this is what 
perception and analysis attempt to do. Their role in effect is to take 
large volumes of raw data and extract from it summaries that we 
can use.145 
That describes, succinctly, the heuristic function and suggests how 
conflation of cognitive and complexity theories intimates something 
important about justice in contract agreement doctrine.  
Consider “Z” in Figure 2 as the constituting “rule,” say, a justice 
criterion in the case of contract agreement, and the ensuing data points (the 
“x’s” and “y’s”) as conventional, phenomenal elaborations therefrom. 
Each data point marks a reaction to the rule or a reaction to a reaction 
(etc.) to the rule and triggers progression in the way Margolis describes 
pattern development and recognition.146 The “x” and “y” elaboration 
pyramids of two or more hypothetical human agents may overlap. That is, 
the justice conceptions of each agent (in terms of contract agreement) 
share criteria. So long as the facts of the particular contract agreement fall 
within that overlap, “justice” compels a finding (and fixes the substance) 
of contract agreement. That is all we mean when we say that we—the two 
of us, together—find or refuse to find contract agreement by reference to 
justice. We must understand justice, then, by reference to such a heuristic 
function.  
3. A Structure 
Complexity theory provides the means to depict metaphorically that 
heuristic function and its incidents in terms of legal rules (and Law). 
Stephen Wolfram works with patterns of cellular automata and concludes 
that we may learn a great deal about how we encounter and process data 
by studying the process that determines how we experience patterns of 
input.147 Wolfram develops his model from the way computers execute a 
program.148 Nature and nature’s agents, e.g., humans, elaborate simple 
fundamental rules much as computers “run” a program. Wolfram’s “new 
science” is, in the truest sense, fundamental. His crucial discovery is that 
 145. WOLFRAM, supra note 142, at 548. 
 146. This conjures to mind Kelsen’s understanding of the “basic norm’s” relation to the norms 
that proceed from it. See HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 201 (Max Knight trans., 1967). 
 147. See generally WOLFRAM, supra note 142. 
 148. Id. ch. 2. 
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complex systems evolve from simple rules.149 His work with cellular 
automata demonstrates visually the progress of a rule through multiple 
levels of elaboration. 
Here is Wolfram’s illustration and accompanying caption: 
FIGURE 3150 
 
Wolfram describes the operation of cellular automata and what they 
may reveal about complexity: “The cellular automaton consists of a line of 
cells, each colored either black or white. At every step there is then a 
definite rule that determines the color [black or white] of that cell and its 
immediate left and right neighbors on the step before.”151 The array 
described by the cells as they are distributed according to the constituting 
“rule” may reveal a discernible pattern or, alternatively, a random 
collection of black and white spaces. So the rule may result in a non-
random simple pattern or a complex apparently random pattern. If a simple 
pattern results, we can readily see regularity in the elaboration of the rule. 
If, instead, what emerges is a complex pattern, an apparently random 
array, that depicts complexity. 
 
 
 149. Id. at 1–4. 
 150. Id. at 27. 
 151. Id. at 24. He is, of course, not describing living cells, but colored squares to be placed in rows 
one atop the other. 
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In Wolfram’s cellular automata, the “evolution” or “elaboration” of the 
rule is entirely endogenous: Each step is determined only by the rule and 
the “data” supplied by the immediately previous step, which data was, in 
turn, the product of the rule’s operation on the data supplied by its 
immediately preceding step. There is nothing striking about Wolfram’s 
demonstration that simple patterns evolve from simple rules; that is how 
we would intuit the world works. What is remarkable, though, is his 
discovery that complex arrays likewise evolve from simple rules. Indeed, 
all complexity is founded on simplicity, on simple rules. 
Wolfram illustrates that discovery by demonstrating the elaboration of 
a simple rule.152 First, the rule:  
[L]ook at each cell and its right-hand neighbor. If both of these were 
white on the previous step, then take the new color of the cell to be 
whatever the previous color of its left-hand neighbor was. 
Otherwise, take the new color to be the opposite of that.153 
Wolfram then depicts the cellular automaton produced if you start with 
just one black cell and then apply the rule repeatedly.154 The result is 
reproduced above.155 The elaboration that simple rule reveals is striking: 
“Rather than getting a simple regular pattern . . . the cellular automaton 
instead produces a pattern that seems extremely irregular and complex.”156 
Wolfram describes that as “the single most surprising scientific discovery 
I have ever made.”157  
The foregoing, in essence, is all we need of Wolfram’s theory to 
support analogy to elaboration of rules in Law. Can the complexity of a 
cellular automaton rule’s elaboration in Wolfram’s “new science” reveal 
something about the nature of legal rule elaboration in Law, the 
development of doctrine?  
The first obstacle to analogy may be the fact that Wolfram’s rules are 
endogenous while Law’s rules may be exogenous. But that distinction, I 
maintain, is a matter of rule construction. It is the constituents and breadth 
of the rule that determines whether its elaboration is endogenous or 
exogenous. In the case of a rule such as “justice determines contract 
agreement” it is difficult to see what could be exogenous—not part of the 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 27. 
 154. Id. 
 155. See supra fig.3. 
 156. See WOLFRAM, supra note 142, at 27. 
 157. Id. 
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justice query—and still be pertinent to operation (elaboration) of the rule. 
At least in the case of rules that lend themselves to justice-like analyses,158 
elaboration of the rules is determined by endogenous criteria. Even 
allowing that the constituents and operation of Wolfram’s cellular rules are 
endogenous and the constituents of legal rules and their operation are 
exogenous, that would, for the metaphorical purposes here, cut just the 
right way: It should be more difficult to discern the regular pattern in legal 
rules’ operation—more likely to find complexity—than it would in the 
endogenous world of Wolfram’s cellular automata, where we know—
because Wolfram has showed us—that even the simplest rules may result 
in complexity. The simplest rule of law, then, might reveal complexity (for 
some) in its operation because its operation is not constrained in the way a 
wholly endogenous rule would be. 
Still you might respond that Wolfram’s rules lend themselves to certain 
determinations in the course of their elaboration: After all, the “next” cell 
is either black or white; there are no shades of gray. The Law, conversely, 
is all about shades of gray; the laws that matter, those that we study, do not 
admit of depiction in wholly dichotomous terms. That is true, of course, 
and seems at first to undermine the analogy.  
But there are two responses to that reservation: First, once you realize 
that “shades of gray” is nothing more than a function of black and white 
points from a particular perspective—the way black and white television 
receivers translate all color tones—you recognize that the difference 
between Wolfram’s most basic cellular automata and the mosaic that is 
legal rules’ elaboration is a matter of perspective, of how you are seeing 
the concentration of white to black shades in the pattern revealed by 
elaboration of the rule. From a certain remove (a finer “grain”) and after 
enough elaborative steps (thousands, even millions) shades of gray would 
emerge even from Wolfram’s bi-chromatic cells.  
Second, there is no reason that Wolfram’s cells must be strictly bi-
chromatic. The cells could be as many shades of as many colors as we can 
imagine; all that matters is that the product of their elaboration of a simple 
rule may depict a simple, predictable pattern or a complex, irregular 
pattern.159 Whether and the extent to which we can perceive a regular 
(non-complex) pattern is not a function of the initial rule’s complexity, so 
no matter how simply we configure the initial rule we can get complexity. 
 158. See supra note 23. 
 159. Of course, complexity is a matter of degree and perception; so there is probably not, strictly 
speaking, a dichotomous simplicity and complexity—whether something is complex and how complex 
it is is a matter of perception. 
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All that Law is concerned with, of course, is complexity. Wolfram’s 
cellular automata tell us something about the relationship between 
complexity and rules and so—in that way—mimic the elaboration of legal 
rules.  
Most importantly, for Law, Wolfram’s contribution to complexity 
theory provides us the means to depict graphically two legal phenomena: 
(1) the evolution of a rule over time160 and (2) the idiosyncrasy of a rule’s 
elaboration—the use pertinent to the focus of this Essay. This second 
phenomenon combines with the cognitive theory reviewed in the previous 
section161 to demonstrate the range of consensus. A minor adjustment in 
the simplest initial rules may lead to profound differences in the resulting 
elaboration patterns of those rules. When the elaboration patterns are 
regular and converge sufficiently there is the predictability and consensus 
essential to Law; where the patterns do not converge—even if there is 
regularity, predictability—there will be a lack of consensus 
notwithstanding the similarity of the initial rules. Both minor differences 
between or among initial rules and minor variations in exogenous factors 
may yield different patterns. To the extent that Law is inconsiderate or 
insufficiently considerate of those minor differences and variations, Law 
fails to account for the necessary idiosyncrasy of human agents that 
determines the operation of legal rules. For the rule Law cares about is not 
the statement of the initial simple rule, such as “justice determines contract 
agreement”; it is the elaboration of that rule, the doctrine, which may be 
captured in the diverse arrays depicted by Wolfram’s cellular automata.  
 160. As an example, consider the evolution of the doctrine of promissory estoppel. See Jay M. 
Feinman, Promissory Estoppel and Judicial Method, 97 HARV. L. REV. 678 (1984); Eric Mills 
Holmes, The Four Phases of Promissory Estoppel, 20 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 45 (1996); Eric Mills 
Holmes, Restatement of Promissory Estoppel, 32 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 263 (1996); see also Daniel A. 
Farber & John H. Matheson, Beyond Promissory Estoppel: Contract Law and the “Invisible 
Handshake,” 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 903, 905 (1985) (promissory estoppel has merged into consideration 
doctrine and is no longer grounded in detrimental reliance); Edward Yorio & Steve Thel, The 
Promissory Basis of Section 90, 101 YALE L.J. 111, 111 (1991) (in practice, liability and remedy under 
Section 90 turn on promise, not reliance).  
 On the success of claims based on promissory estoppel, see Robert A. Hillman, Questioning the 
“New Consensus” On Promissory Estoppel: An Empirical and Theoretical Study, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 
580, 580 (1998) (low rate of success for promissory estoppel claims). But see Juliet P. Kostritsky, The 
Rise and Fall of Promissory Estoppel Or Is Promissory Estoppel Really as Unsuccessful as Scholars 
Say It Is: A New Look at the Data, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 531, 539 (2002) (high rate of success 
after controlling for inherently weak claims). 
 161. See supra notes 124–36 and accompanying text. 
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C. “Justice” Conception Perceived 
Wolfram’s conclusion regarding pattern recognition in the case of 
cellular automata pertains as well to human reasoning including justice 
reasoning: “I suspect that there are fundamental limitations on what 
perception and analysis can ever be expected to do. For there seem to be 
many kinds of systems in which it is overwhelmingly easier to generate 
highly complex behavior than to recognize the origins of this behavior.”162 
The vagueness of the justice determination in the context of contract 
agreement, then, may be understood at least in part as a product of the 
perception dilemma revealed in the heuristic function and its incidents. So 
the justice determination in any single contract agreement controversy is a 
matter of sufficient confluence among idiosyncratic justice (in the case of 
contract agreement163) conceptions. 
That does not, however, account for justice as a contract doctrine. 
Deriving the basis (more likely, the bases) of doctrine from consensus in 
measuring contract agreement by justice is in fact an effort to go from 
complexity back to the inputs that determined that complexity, their 
“origins.”164 To posit a structure of justice as doctrine in contract 
agreement, we need to understand the consensus dilemma, the particular 
challenge confronting Law once we see Law as a response to corporate 
heuristic discontinuities, an organizational challenge that essentially asks 
human agents to respond to stimuli they do not perceive just because 
others perceive them.165 Law is, after all, “a solution to the problem of the 
limits of moral knowledge.”166 Legal doctrine necessarily assumes, indeed 
is based on the premise, that morality is not accessible to all of Law’s 
subjects equally.167 We may appreciate Law as the effort to make legal 
conceptions so accessible.  
 162. WOLFRAM, supra note 142, at 550–51. 
 163. It follows from the foregoing that there could be (which is not to say that there are) as many 
different phases of justice as there are contexts in which justice is determinative. 
 164. Wolfram explains: 
As I have discussed in this book, it is rather easy to generate complex behavior by starting 
from simple initial conditions and then following simple sets of rules. But the point is that if 
one starts from some particular piece of behavior there are in general no such simple rules 
that allow one to go backwards and find out how this behavior can be produced. Typically the 
problem is similar to trying to find solutions that will satisfy certain constraints.  
Id. at 551. 
 165. So construed, Law is a response to perceptual and analytical incongruity; Law facilitates 
pattern recognition and reduces corporate heuristic error. 
 166. ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, supra note 14, at 232 n.4. 
 167. See Kavka, supra note 14. 
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The source of the consensus sufficient for Law—the consensus 
obtainable within the constraints of the dimension depicted by legal 
morality (coordination, expertise, and efficiency)—is in the scope of the 
common area among the heuristic patterns of the human agents subject to 
the Law. The coincidence must be found in the scheme of the connections 
among the data points in the agents’ corporate heuristic patterns. The 
more coincidence among those agents’ corporate heuristic patterns, the 
more a law is possible, and, in turn, the more possible Law is.168 Now we 
are likely to conclude that insufficient coincidence constitutes randomness. 
And randomness is a manifestation of amorality, the want of legal 
morality, the failure of a law as Law. “Random justice” is an oxymoron 
and contract agreement based on random justice is fatally insubstantial: It 
fails as doctrine. 
It follows, then, that our reactions to rules (as, per Margolis, our 
perceptions) need not be identical for us to function cooperatively for there 
to be Law. Were that otherwise, we could not function at all. Figure 2 
above describes sufficient interpersonal identity of data perception to 
support cooperation.169 Law too relies on sufficient (not absolute) identity 
of perception to support cooperation. Interpersonal discontinuities, 
idiosyncrasy, assure that we all “see” the elaboration from “Z” (e.g., 
“justice determines contract agreement”) differently. In fact, the 
dissonance among our elaboration patterns may be so diffuse across a 
large enough sample as to threaten cooperation. The bases of dissonance, 
recall, would be both our divergent perceptions of constituting rule Z and 
the divergent elaborations therefrom that would ensue. So with all that 
room for idiosyncrasy, how can legal morality realize the consensus that 
constitutes Law? 
The answer may be found in the realm of polytypic concepts: 
Suppose we have an aggregation of individuals . . . such that: 
1) Each one possesses a large (but unspecified) number of the 
properties in G 
 168. Herein too of Kelsen’s necessary efficacy of Law, his “principle of effectiveness.” See HANS 
KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 366–68 (1946). See also H.L.A. HART, THE 
CONCEPT OF LAW 116 (2d ed. 1994): 
[T]hose rules of behavior which are valid according to the system’s ultimate criteria of 
validity must be generally obeyed, and its rules of recognition specifying criteria of legal 
validity and its rules of change and adjudication must be effectively accepted as common 
public standards of official behavior by its officials. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 169. See supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
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2) Each f in G is possessed by large numbers of these individuals; 
and 
3) No f in G is possessed by every individual in the aggregate. 
By the terms of ‘3),’ no f is necessary for membership in this 
aggregate; and nothing has been said to either warrant or rule out 
the possibility that some f in G is sufficient for membership in the 
aggregate. Nevertheless, under some conditions the members would 
and should be regarded as a class K constituting the extension of a 
concept defined in terms of the properties in G. If n is large, all the 
members of K will resemble each other, although they will not 
resemble each other in respect to a given f. If n is very large, it 
would be possible to arrange the members of K along a line in such 
a way that each individual resembles his nearest neighbors very 
closely and his further neighbors less closely. The members near the 
extremes would each resemble each other hardly at all, e.g., they 
might have none of the f’s in G in common.170 
The structure posited in this Essay depicts the relation that arises from 
an understanding of legal doctrine as a polytypic concept. The heuristic 
function assures that there will be dissonance among idiosyncratic 
appreciations of rule and rule’s application: Each of our Figure 1171 
patterns will diverge, as a function of and within the bounds of human 
agency. That is, there will be polytypic “consensus” somewhere short of 
general agreement and that consensus is sufficient to the object of Law. 
The coincidence of heuristic patterns elaborated from phenomenal 
premises assures sufficient consensus for Law to operate even when there 
is neither identity of data nor identity of constituting rule. The structure, in 
Figure 2, demonstrates how that can be so. We see legal morality’s 
relation to Law, particularly in terms of Law’s “consensus,” its doctrine, 
when we conceive of the polytypic conception of legal morality as 
 170. MORTON BECKNER, THE BIOLOGICAL WAY OF THOUGHT 22–23 (1959). Beckner recognizes 
that Wittgenstein “emphasized the importance that concepts of this logical character assume in 
ordinary language.” Id. at 23. The Wittgensteinian idea is developed by Brian Bix, Michael Moore’s 
Realist Approach to Law, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1303 n.47 (1992), and Moore responded to that 
“criteriological” or “imprecise definition” theory of meaning, supra note 126, at 2487. Recognize, 
though, that the polytypic structure suggested here is not a theory of meaning that tells us anything 
about our use of the word “morality” or any other word, for that matter. It is an illustration of Law’s 
response to the consensus dilemma, a means to structure, to see what is operating when Law fixes or 
reflects consensus. I do not mean to suggest that this consensus is any more than conventional and I do 
not suggest that this type of convention is anything more than a fact; i.e., I do not suggest it is a value. 
 171. See supra note 138 and accompanying text. 
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sufficiently coincidental pyramidal constructs. We need not see the same 
things, we need not start from any more identity than human agency 
allows in order for the heuristic function to describe legal morality. 
To see the analytical affinity between randomness–insufficient 
heuristic pattern coincidence—and amorality in the case of legal morality, 
recognize that randomness/amorality is not a matter of existential fact; it is 
a judgment concerning the phenomenal and therefore subject to all of the 
vicissitudes of judgment generally. So randomness/amorality is best 
appreciated as a matter of degree on a legal morality continuum. For us to 
identify the constituents of a justice doctrine in contract agreement that is 
substantial, the pattern of justice’s elaboration in terms of contract 
agreement must be discernible, non-random. 
Wolfram’s conclusions resonate with the justice-legal morality relation 
so reconceived: 
Indeed, what I suspect is that ultimately no useful definition of 
randomness can be based solely on the issue of what short 
descriptions [i.e., heuristics] of something may in principle exist. 
Rather, any useful [read ‘efficacious’] definition [‘doctrine’] must, I 
believe, make at least some reference to how such short descriptions 
are supposed to be found [revealed by convention].172 
“[H]ow such short descriptions are supposed to be found,” 
nonrandomness, discernible pattern, is a function of the observer’s 
perceptual and analytical acuity.173 Legal morality is, at least in significant 
part, a matter of predictability, nonrandomness, of pattern by reference to 
rule, e.g., justice determines contract agreement. For Wolfram, and 
perhaps for moral philosophers, “something should be considered to be 
random [compare amoral, not consistent with legal morality] whenever 
there is essentially no simple [perceptually and analytically accessible and 
predictable] program that can succeed in detecting regularities in it.”174 
And it is only intellectually honest to hold open the possibility that one 
reason no pattern is discernible may be, perhaps in some metaphysical 
sense, that there is no pattern: E.g., justice, at least in this context, may be 
insubstantial. 
If a pattern is inaccessible to human agents, there is no pattern (at least 
not as to those for whom the pattern is inaccessible and so random). The 
 172. WOLFRAM, supra note 142, at 555 (emphasis added). 
 173. The reliability of a pattern, of the conclusion that data are not random, is, in turn, a measure 
of a heuristic’s reliability. 
 174. WOLFRAM, supra note 142, at 556. 
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fact that a pattern is manifest, i.e., in convention, acknowledges 
accessibility and is evidence of a pattern. Law, convention, can reveal the 
operation of legal morality, which is not to say that convention can be 
morality.  
To sum up, more concretely: 
First principles find their elaboration in rules, and that is true of the 
accessible (e.g., certain contracts must be in writing) as well as of the less 
accessible (e.g., “justice determines contract agreement”) first principles. 
In order for us to be able to posit a rule, say, “if x, then yy,” we must have 
an array on which we would impose that “rule.” Once we have imposed 
the rule on the array, we discover the rule’s elaboration. Imagine that “if x, 
then yy” is a generic rendition of a rule such as “justice determines 
contract agreement,” which would find its too simplistic elaboration in a 
world where justice is certainly the measure of contract agreement. But 
there is sufficient disagreement about what is just in the context of 
contract agreement to question the “ruleness” of “justice determines 
contract agreement.” Confronted by a world in which seemingly unjust 
agreements are enforced and just agreements are not enforced, we need to 
find the source of disjunction between rule and reality. Hill175 and 
Klocek176 cannot both be right anymore than Groves177 and Peevyhouse178 
can both be right. It may be that the rule is not followed: People act 
inconsistently with the rule. Or it may be that the “rule” is ephemeral, 
ultimately insubstantial. The doctrine that would capture the rule is only 
revealed in the rule’s elaboration, not simply in its formulation. And 
complexity theory, via cellular automata, may demonstrate the product of 
elaboration, may depict the Lawness, the non-randomness, or the not-
Lawness, the randomness revealed by that elaboration. 
Once the perspectival and cognitive patterns of an array of human 
actors diverge too much, as a matter of intellectual, temporal, cultural, 
gender, perhaps even ethnic perspective (“the members near the 
extremes”),179 the polytypic coincidence will be too ephemeral, and there 
will not be sufficient consensus to support Law. There is failure of 
doctrine and, at the margins, there may be no Law. For example, we could 
say that “justice determines contract agreement” may be doctrinally 
vacuous. The structure developed here demonstrates what we could mean 
 175. See supra notes 108–22 and accompanying text. 
 176. See supra note 115. 
 177. See supra note 78. 
 178. See supra notes 70–84 and accompanying text. 
 179. See supra note 170 and accompanying text. 
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by that. What we call doctrine may be revealed in polytypic consensus; it 
is not a matter of polytypic consensus. The law of contract agreement 
understood in the process terms of this Essay does not shift as intellectual, 
temporal, cultural, gender, and ethnic contexts et al. shift; instead, it is the 
center of polytypic gravity that shifts in relation to that law, and so may 
shift again. Whether “justice determines contract agreement” succeeds, or 
even really exists, as doctrine is a matter of finding the center of polytypic 
gravity in the subject community. Cognitive and complexity theories 
establish for us that that is all “justice” can mean in terms of legal 
morality. 
CONCLUSION: CONTRIBUTION 
The cases discussed in Part I invoked a justice calculus to determine 
the fact and extent of contract agreement. The scope of those decisions is 
quite broad, and each of the decisions has had a substantial effect on the 
law of contract agreement. A plausible reaction might be that justice 
calculus undermines the certainty of “agreement” and ultimately dissolves 
contract. That, indeed, may be so, if we conceive of contract agreement in 
terms that are inconsiderate of human agency. We may have all the 
certainty in contract agreement that we can have, given the aim of legal 
morality and the realities of human cognition. It is, nonetheless, 
worthwhile—indeed, even crucial—to appreciate the limits of doctrine in 
contract, and recourse to a structure derived from complexity theory 
reveals the causes and contours of those limits. 
So the structure developed in Part II neither reconciles nor tries to 
make sense of the cases discussed in Part I. That was not the object: This 
Essay does not promote a normative theory; it endeavors only to offer a 
positive account of doctrine in the context of contract agreement. The 
structure instead demonstrates how the evolution of a legal rule results in 
doctrine and what doctrine, schematically, looks like in relation to the 
foundational rule, particularly when it is the case that the rule (as 
construed) admits of the idiosyncratic variety a justice criterion 
accommodates. While I suspect that the structure would depict well the 
evolution of doctrine in settings that admit of more certainty (less 
explicitly normative criteria), that need not be the case in order to support 
invocation of the structure in this important contract law setting.  
The structure developed in this Essay effects a consilience: It merges 
legal, cognitive, and complexity theories to depict what happens as 
doctrine emerges, and it provides the means to appraise the substantiality 
(or insubstantiality) of, specifically, a justice criterion of agreement in the 
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contract law. The hope is that even if the picture is off a bit, it would 
support further inquiry into the nature and limits of a particular contract 
doctrine. The structure is a place to start.  
Notwithstanding the fact that the object of this Essay is positive and not 
normative, the structure of legal rules’ elaboration that emerges from the 
analogy to Wolfram’s complexity theory may have both positive and 
normative consequences for the Contract law: Positively it may describe 
the necessary relation between idiosyncratic cognitive experience and the 
consensus that establishes law. It can depict, graphically, the 
disaggregating forces that strain the fabric of legal doctrine, both over time 
and over legal communities (including discrete commercial communities). 
The structure as well reveals congruities obscured by the terms 
constituting legal doctrine. For example, insofar as “agreement,”180 
“bargain,”181 and “unconscionability”182 occupy the same doctrinal 
space—or at least overlap—the structure can demonstrate their 
coincidence at a fundamental level. The same doctrinal redundancy 
between consideration and promissory estoppel183 doctrines could as well 
be made manifest. The viability of the structure would, in fact, be 
determined by its efficacy in demonstrating those doctrinal tensions in the 
contract law.  
Normatively the structure provides the basis to reconceptualize the 
justice-contract relation and perhaps even the Law-morality relation more 
generally. If “justice” in the case of contract agreement connotes (or even 
denotes) a moral inquiry, then the structure challenges us to determine 
where the moral inquiry intercedes in the course of the pattern or rule’s 
elaboration. Do we determine the morality of a particular prescription or 
proscription by comparing the result a morality would provide with the 
 180. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(3) (2003) (defining “agreement” as “the bargain of the parties in 
fact, as found in their language or inferred from other circumstances, including course of performance, 
course of dealing, or usage of trade . . . .”; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 3 (1981). Recall 
supra text accompanying note 26 (defining “agreement” as “a manifestation of mutual assent on the 
part of two or more persons”). 
 181. The Second Restatement of Contracts defines “bargain,” in pertinent part: “A bargain is an 
agreement to exchange promises or to exchange a promise for a performance or to exchange 
performances.” Id. § 3. 
 182. See id. § 208: 
If a contract or term thereof is unconscionable at the time the contract is made a court may 
refuse to enforce the contract, or may enforce the remainder of the contract without the 
unconscionable term, or may so limit the application of any unconscionable term as to avoid 
any unconscionable result. 
For a discussion of the affinity between the bargain and unconscionability concepts, see Peter A. 
Alces, Contract Reconceived, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 39, 63–66 (2001). 
 183. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981). 
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result the rule provides? Or do we find morality in the interstices of the 
rule’s elaborative pattern?  
From those premises, what might the structure disclose about 
perspective so far as legal morality is concerned? Nietzsche’s 
perspectivism captures well, albeit only analogously, the sense of morality 
that a structure of legal morality could reveal: 
 There is only a perspective seeing, only a perspective ‘knowing’; 
the more affects we allow to speak about a thing, the more eyes, 
various eyes we are able to use for the same thing, the more 
complete will be our ‘concept’ of the thing, our ‘objectivity’. . . . 
Strictly speaking, there is no ‘presuppositionless’ knowledge, the 
thought of such a thing is unthinkable, paralogical: a philosophy, a 
‘faith’ always has to be there first, for knowledge to win from it a 
direction, a meaning, a limit, a method, a right to exist.184 
The structure emphasizes the relationship between that moral 
perspectivism and the genesis, as well as evolution, of legal doctrine. To 
the extent that we conclude the elaboration of a legal rule is the product of 
moral forces (both endogenous, as in the case, for example, of “justice” in 
section 90 of the Second Restatement of Contracts,185 and exogenous), the 
structure challenges us to discover where and how the moral calculus 
intercedes. The structure does not so much provide the answer as it 
organizes the inquiry. 
Extended, complexity theory could ultimately reveal a concept of Law, 
but that is best left for another day. 
 184. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ON THE GENEALOGY OF MORALITY 92, 119 (Keith Ansell-Pearson 
ed., 1994). For a particularly helpful exploration of Nietzschean perspectivism, see BRIAN LEITER, 
ROUTLEDGE PHILOSOPHY GUIDEBOOK TO NIETZSCHE ON MORALITY 264–79 (2002). 
 185. Section 90 states: 
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on 
the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or forbearance is 
binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The remedy granted 
for breach may be limited as justice requires. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981) (emphasis added). 
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